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IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM:
A RETURN TO FORM
DAVID S. RUBENSTEIN∗
INTRODUCTION
1

At the heart of the “subfederal immigration revolution” are two
core questions. The first is what to do about our “broken” immigration
2
system, especially regarding an estimated eleven million individuals
3
unlawfully present. This question ignites impassioned debates on civil
liberties, the rule of law, the economy, foreign relations, and who “we”
4
are (or wish to be) as a nation. For now, at least, the only common
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Concannon for excellent research assistance.
1. This moniker refers to the spate of state and local laws directed at unlawful immigrants
in the past few years. For statistical accounts of the spike in state laws over the past five years,
see State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.
aspx (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (reporting the introduction of more than 7000 state
immigration-related bills and the passage of more than 1000 state laws and resolutions).
2. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 617 (2012) (noting “[t]he general view that the current U.S.
immigration system is broken” as a contributing factor of the “enactment of a record number of
state and local immigration laws”); see also Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the
President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (July 1, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigrationreform) (calling for reforms of the “broken” U.S. immigration system).
3. See, e.g., Michael Hoefer et al., Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy Directorate,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigration Population Residing in
the United States: January 2011, at 3 (2012) (providing statistical estimates). Estimates of the
size of the undocumented population vary, in part because it requires the counting of a shadow
population, but also due to competing conceptions of what it means to be illegally present.
4. For a sampling of competing viewpoints from multiple commentators, see Special
Feature: Immigration, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/
immigration (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (compiling posts from various authors on immigration);
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5

denominator is that something should be done. This unsatisfying
consensus invites the revolution’s second core question: which
institution of government, relative to others, has the power to do
6
what. Although Congress has the lawmaking power, it has yet to
meet the demand for immigration reform. Meanwhile, the Federal
Executive has proven unable or unwilling to effectively enforce the
7
statutory law currently in effect. Frustrated, and by default, states and
localities increasingly have sought to “cooperate” in immigration
8
enforcement through self-help measures. The federal administration,
however, has generally rebuked these subfederal initiatives and has
9
sought to enjoin them on preemption grounds. Our unelected
judiciary has thus been tasked to sort it out, twice by the Supreme
10
Court in as many years.
see also, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of
Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675, 675 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky,
The Making of United States Refugee Policy] (“[O]ur immigration policies quite literally define
who we are as a people and what qualities we admire and disdain in others. Consequently, the
formulation of immigration policy requires value judgments about the optimal size of our
population, the composition of our society, and our general economic direction.”).
5. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2047
(2008).
6. In similar fashion, Hiroshi Motomura describes the dual questions identified here as
“what” to do and “who” can do it. His approach to answering these questions, however, differs
in several critical respects from mine. Most notably, he suggests approaching the question of
“who” with consideration to the question of “what.” See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of
Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1728, 1738−46
(2010) [hereinafter Motomura, The Rights of Others]. But my own view is that these questions
are legally distinct, should be treated that way, and that distortion of the former by the latter is a
dangerous (even if principled) means to an end. For further discussion of these points, see infra
Part IV.
7. See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, SUP.
CT. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25) [hereinafter Cox, Enforcement Redundancy]
(suggesting that the Executive’s under-enforcement policies are due to both resource
constraints and ideological preferences).
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Speaker Hubbard Responds to Effort to Overturn New
Immigration Law (July 8, 2011) (“If the federal government won’t enforce its own laws and
protect Alabama, we must protect ourselves.”); Press Release, House Vote Sends Immigration
Bill to Gov’s Desk, SOUTH CAROLINA STATEHOUSE BLOG (Jun. 21, 2011),
http://sc.statehouseblogs.com/2011/06/21/house-vote-sends-immigration-bill-togov%E2%80%99s-desk-press-release/ (“If Washington refuses to effectively support our law
enforcement officers by enforcing immigration laws, it is left up to the states to stand up and do
what is right.”).
9. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012); United States v. Alabama,
691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); see Adam Cox & Eric Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2012) (noting the administration’s “nearly unprecedented
step” of suing to enjoin the states on preemption grounds).
10. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497 (addressing the United States Justice Department’s
claim that Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act was
preempted by federal law); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011)
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This presages an unsettling irony. We may be trying to fix a broken
immigration system with a broken government. If so, perhaps more
critical attention should be directed at mending our institutional
structure and political processes. This Article introduces a theory of
“immigration structuralism” as part of a larger project toward those
ends. The theory’s major premise, and contribution, is that we should
consult both separation of powers and federalism norms in addressing
11
the subfederal revolution’s core question of relative power. This
approach recognizes the important relationship between our
structural dimensions and seeks to harness that relationship in
12
politically reinforcing ways.
Sensitivity to separation of powers is especially vital for assessing
claims about the preemptive effect of executive enforcement policies.
Approaches to preemption that sideline the distinction between
executive policies and congressional statutes incentivize Congress to
abdicate lawmaking to the Executive, the Executive to usurp
Congress’s lawmaking role, or both. In turn, these aberrations in the
lawmaking process undermine the political and procedural
13
protections guaranteed to the states in the Constitution. My
suggested approach, by contrast, draws a fundamental distinction
between legislative and nonbinding executive action, such that only
the former may trump subfederal law. As will be seen, this approach

(upholding the Ninth Circuit’s determination that Arizona’s Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007
was not preempted by federal immigration law).
11. Cf. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 2) (observing that
Arizona v. United States is as much about separation of powers as it is about federalism).
12. On the interdimensional relationship between separation of powers and federalism, my
thinking is indebted to the influential work of Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard
of Separation-of-Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation
of Powers]; Brandon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004);
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008).
13. On the political and procedural safeguards, see, for example, Clark, Separation of
Powers, supra note 12, at 1323–24 (“[F]ederal lawmaking procedures . . . preserve federalism
both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning lawmaking power solely to
actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism.”); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–58 (1954) (observing that “the national political
process in the United States—and especially the role of the states in the composition and
selection of the central government—is intrinsically well adapted to” protecting the states
against federal intrusion); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1349, 1362 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers] (“Inertia and inefficiency are similar
tools that play an important role in protecting state autonomy from federal incursions.”). See
also infra notes 269−71 and accompanying text.
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better safeguards both federalism and separation of powers.
To bring these themes into sharp relief, this Article draws from
two recent examples. The first is the Executive’s Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, introduced in the summer of
14
2012. Under the DACA program, unlawfully present immigrants
who came to the United States at a young age and who meet other
eligibility criteria may remain and lawfully work here for renewable
15
two-year periods. DACA is now the target of a lawsuit by certain
federal immigration agents seeking to enjoin the program on
16
separation of powers grounds. In particular, the complaint alleges
that DACA usurps the legislative function and otherwise violates the
Executive’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be
17
faithfully executed.” The federal administration has emphatically
denied these charges, stressing that DACA does not make “Law” and
is merely an expression of the Executive’s constitutionally vested
18
enforcement discretion.

14. Memorandum for David Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot.,
Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir.,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,
Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[hereinafter
DACA
Memo].
15. Id.
16. Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10,
2012). Mississippi joined as a plaintiff to the case, but the State’s complaints were dismissed for
lack of standing. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 363710 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24,
2013). In an interim opinion, the district court found that it was “likely” the remaining plaintiffs
would be entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining DACA based on the strength of their
statutory and Administrative Procedure Act claims. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 1744422, No.
3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013). But the court reserved making a final decision,
pending further briefing from the parties. Id.
17. Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 16, at 18–20.
18. See DACA Memo, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that while the DACA memorandum
does not confer any substantive rights or a path to citizenship, because that granting authority
remains with Congress, the Executive Branch holds the power to set policy enforcing existing
legislation); see also Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (filed Dec. 19, 2012). The
administration’s legal position is backed by a letter of support authored by Hiroshi Motomura
and signed by nearly 100 law professors. See Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor, UCLA
Sch. of Law, et al. to Barack Obama, President, Executive Authority to Grant Administrative
Relief
for
DREAM
Act
Beneficiaries
1
(May
28,
2012),
available
at
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (“[T]here is clear executive authority for several forms of
administrative relief for [The Development, Relief, and Education for Aliens Minors Act
(Dream Act)] beneficiaries: deferred action, parole-in-place, and deferred enforced
departure.”). This letter was sent only days prior to DACA’s unveiling and may have played a
role in assuaging concerns, earlier expressed by the administration, that only Congress had the
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My intention here is not to resolve this separation of powers
19
issue. Rather, I use it only to provide context and contour for my
theory of immigration structuralism. With that purpose in mind, I
offer what I believe are unobjectionable yet critical observations
about the DACA controversy.
First, along the horizontal dimension, a theoretical division of
20
power exists between lawmaking and law execution. Article I of the
21
Constitution vests “all legislative” power in Congress, while Article
22
II vests the “executive” power in the President. Second, in practice,
identifying the point at which law execution crosses into lawmaking
can be an elusive if not impossible task (especially in close cases,
23
which DACA may be). Third, courts are not institutionally wellpositioned to police that constitutional line and are generally quick to

power to grant the relief requested. Cf. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 463, 472–73 (describing the administration’s earlier position on its lack of authority
to grant DREAM Act-type relief absent congressional action); Lamar Smith, Obama’s Amnesty
for Illegal Immigrants is Against the Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 15, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0615/Lamar-Smith-Obama-amnesty
(quoting President Obama in an interview with Univision television on the subject, as stating
that he could not “waive away the laws that Congress put in place” and that “the president
doesn’t have the authority to simply ignore Congress and say, ‘[w]e’re not going to enforce the
laws that you’ve passed’”).
19. For recent treatments of DACA’s separation of powers issues, see generally Lauren
Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform,
116 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers]; Jeffrey A.
Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012);
Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); John Yoo &
Robert Delahunty, The Obama Administration, the DREAM Act and the Take Care Clause, 91
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
20. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(invalidating the President’s executive order to seize and operate steel mills because it
amounted to lawmaking, a power vested solely in Congress); see also supra notes 6, 18 and
accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
22. Id. art. II, § 1.
23. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1681, 1702 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, The Procedural Safeguards] (“[T]here is no bright
line, judicially administrable test for distinguishing (permissible) law execution from
(impermissible) lawmaking.”). For an argument that DACA crosses the line, and is thus an
impermissible exercise of executive power, see Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19. For arguments
to the contrary, see Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19, and Love & Garg, supra
note 19. For an enlightened argument that DACA cannot be justified as an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, but is nevertheless sustainable as an act of presidential stewardship, see
Margulies, supra note 19.
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24

reject invitations to do so. Accordingly, the theoretical question of
whether the boundary between lawmaking and law execution has
been crossed is generally resolved, if at all, through the political
25
process alone. Fourth—and getting closer to the project at hand—
DACA implicates not only separation of powers but also federalism.
Specifically, qualifying immigrants are afforded permission to remain
in the United States and, by default, permission to reside in the states
and cities of their choosing. Moreover, insofar as DACA beneficiaries
are granted legal permission to work, this implicates traditional
subfederal interests in labor and employment. Indeed, aroused by
these localist concerns, Arizona quickly responded with a
countermeasure to deny drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries, thus
26
undermining or neutralizing some of DACA’s putative purpose.
27
Other states have taken or threatened similar action. Thus, the
payoff question: can the Executive’s DACA initiative preempt
28
conflicting subfederal policy?
24. Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (rejecting
a claim of selective immigration prosecution and noting the particular difficulties with
“invad[ing] a special province of the Executive” over its prosecutorial discretion); Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or
enforce the law is generally committed to the agency’s discretion); see also INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (noting that “when any branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the
power the Constitution has delegated to it”).
25. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 114 (2000) (explaining that remedies for conflicts between congressional will and
executive enforcement “lie more often in congressional oversight or the election booth than in
the courthouse”).
26. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06 (Aug. 15, 2012) (directing state agencies to take
necessary steps to “prevent [DACA] recipients from obtaining eligibility . . . for any . . . state
identification, including a driver’s license”).
27. Mississippi, like Arizona, has declared DACA beneficiaries ineligible to receive drivers
licenses. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1299 (Aug. 22, 2012). Last year, Michigan also took the position
that it would not grant drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries, but it has recently determined
that it would. See Niraj Warikoo, Michigan Secretary of State Does U-Turn; Will Grant Driver’s
Licenses to Qualifying Immigrants, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2013. Meanwhile, North
Carolina has taken a middle-ground approach: granting drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries,
but which include the words “no lawful status” directly above the person’s name. See Martha
Waggoner, NC Abandons Pink Stripe on Immigrant Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 21,
2013),
http://news.yahoo.com/nc-abandons-pink-stripes-immigrant-licenses-221544718.html.
Still, the vast majority of states have expressly indicated that they would grant drivers licenses to
DACA beneficiaries. See Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGRATION
LAW CENTER, available at http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated Mar. 29,
2013).
28. The American Civil Liberties Union seems to think so, as reflected in its complaint
against the Arizona licensing program. See Complaint, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer,
No. 2:12-cv-02546 (D. Az. Nov. 29, 2012) (arguing the Governor’s executive order denying
driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries violates the Supremacy Clause); see also Complaint,
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29

A second example was showcased in Arizona v. United States,
30
though, I submit, not fully resolved. There, the federal administration
31
claimed that its enforcement priorities preempted Arizona laws.
More specifically, the proffered conflict was between executive
policies that focus enforcement resources on targeted subclasses of
unlawfully present immigrants and Arizona’s arrest-and-report laws
that target a generic and undifferentiated class of undocumented
32
immigrants. The question again is presented: Can the Executive’s
enforcement priorities preempt conflicting subfederal initiatives?
My short answer is that nonbinding executive enforcement
policies cannot, and should not, preempt subfederal law. For reasons
elaborated in more detail below, the Supremacy Clause’s text, context,
and drafting history all point toward limiting the types of preemptive
33
federal laws to the Constitution, statutes, and Treaties. By negative
implication, executive enforcement policies—especially insofar as
they lack the force of law—cannot provide a constitutional basis for
preempting state law.
It is structurally paradoxical for the federal administration to
simultaneously claim that its enforcement policies (1) are not “Law”
34
for separation of powers purposes (2) but are “Law” for preemption
35
purposes. To be clear, my purpose here is not to decry political
hypocrisy. Rather, it is to repel the hypocrisy in constitutional terms.
One Michigan v. Johnson, No. 2:12-15551 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2012) (seeking to enjoin the
Michigan Secretary of State policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries on
preemption and other grounds). Recently, the United States District Court of Arizona held that
Arizona’s policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries was not preempted,
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013
WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim but also holding that the
plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the policy had a likelihood of success).
29. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
30. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 22, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012) (No. 11-182) (“The framework that the Constitution and Congress has created does not
permit the States to adopt their own immigration programs and policies or to set themselves up
as rival decisionmakers based on disagreement with the focus and scope of federal
enforcement.”); see also infra notes 155−62 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 161−63 and accompanying text.
33. See Clark, The Procedural Safeguards, supra note 23, at 1711–12 (making this claim);
see also infra notes 65−77 and accompanying text.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing that a bill may become “Law” only after
traversing the requirements of bicameralism and presentment); see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952) (holding that the President has no inherent
domestic lawmaking authority).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that the “Laws” made pursuant to the
Constitution shall be the “supreme law of the land”).
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Specifically, if the Executive’s exercise of enforcement discretion
crosses into lawmaking, then it is void under separation of powers
principles and thus cannot qualify for preemption. On the other hand,
if the Executive’s prosecutorial discretion is not a form of lawmaking,
then it falls beyond the Supremacy Clause’s preemptive scope. To be
more plain, the Executive cannot have it both ways: its enforcement
36
discretion cannot simultaneously be Law and not be Law.
This structural paradox—like all good puzzles—begs to be solved.
A spirited assault is thus expected, especially given the stakes and an
already deeply invested audience. One “solution,” for example, might
be to assign different meanings to Law for purposes of separation of
powers, on the one hand, and for federalism on the other. This
37
approach is not obviously wrong. Immigration constitutional law is
38
littered with peculiarities tied to foreign affairs and sovereignty.
Thus, it is at least conceivable that there should be exceptional
treatment in the immigration context for what qualifies as preemptive
under the Supremacy Clause, or for what qualifies as law for purposes
39
of separation of powers. Though this article confronts and rejects
proposed solutions to the structural paradox, it does so somewhat
reluctantly. Such forays only detract from my more central message:
We should not want to unravel the paradox, because it safeguards
basic structural values.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews our government structure, its
component elements of separation of powers and federalism, their
interrelatedness, and the liberty-securing values they serve. Part II
offers an account of how separation of powers norms are seriously
threatened in immigration and explains how these potential failings
impact immigration federalism. Part III expounds upon the theory of
36. To be sure, the power of prosecutorial discretion is impliedly vested in the Executive.
But the power of preemption is not. Thus, while the Executive can set enforcement policies,
those policies cannot themselves provide a basis for preempting state law. See infra notes 69−77,
235–50 and accompanying text. Rather, in the face of a conflict, the federal and state law should
operate concurrently, unless and until the latter is preempted by Congress.
37. Cf. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 22–26) (observing that
the question of executive enforcement preemption hinges on competing conceptions of law, and
that the Court’s conception of immigration law to include executive enforcement is
exceptional).
38. See infra notes 93−97, 129−34 and accompanying text.
39. Outside the immigration context, the Court has sent mixed signals. Compare Am. Ins.
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (holding that a foreign affairs policy reflected in
an executive agreement preempted state law), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (rejecting the claim that nonbinding executive foreign-commerce
policies preempted state law).
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immigration structuralism. Among other things, it analyzes and
contrasts two competing models for approaching the question of
which government institution has the relative power to do what. The
conventional model seems to treat potential failings along the
horizontal separation of powers dimension as an inertial push for
further concessions along the vertical federalism dimension. That
approach seems doctrinally precarious. Under the alternative model
that I propose, constitutional capitulations along one dimension
should cause us to insist upon maintaining—if not invigorating—the
prophylactic protections secured by the other. Stated otherwise,
possible failings in our structural norms should counsel for
reinvestment in first principles, not for their further abandonment.
Part IV anticipates some likely resistance to my approach. The
principal objection may be that it puts too much hope in the Framers’
original strategies for securing liberty. Stated differently, perhaps my
approach improvidently elevates form over substance. As will be seen,
this objection harkens to the political question of what to do about
immigration. A great many view the subfederal restrictionist laws as
unethical, impracticable, and distasteful—quite apart from a
40
supporting portfolio of legal objections. Seen in this light, I am
certainly sensitive to arguments favoring substance over form. I also
appreciate that answers to the constitutional question of which, can
have practical implications for the political outcomes of what.
As I hope to demonstrate, however, a consequentialist approach
to the question of what to do about immigration should not distort or
substitute for the separate question of which institution has the power
to do it. It is one thing to invest political faith in the federal
government over the question of what; yet it is quite another to invest
in judicial doctrines that serve to entrench an undifferentiated and
exclusive federal power over the question of which.
Indeed, the push of many of my colleagues toward federal
monopolization in the name of immigrant rights may prove selfdefeating. To begin with, federal monopolization would hamstring

40. Several lawsuits have challenged subfederal laws not only on preemption grounds, but
also based on alleged violations of Equal Protection rights, the First Amendment right to speech
and association, and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. See, e.g., Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino
Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Complaint,
Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2012). See also infra notes 330−32
and accompanying text.
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subfederal initiatives that afford more rights and protection than
41
federal law requires. Of more pressing concern, however, the federal
political branches have not yet settled on a solution to the
immigration problem. If they do so unfavorably to immigrants—a not
42
unlikely scenario given the current trends —what checks will remain?
Certainly, the check will not come from the Judiciary, which has
abdicated meaningful review of political choices concerning
43
immigration under the infamous plenary doctrine. Nor would the
check come from subfederal governments, since a federal monopoly
will leave states and localities nothing to offer.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND THEIR
INTERRELATIONSHIP
Our government was formed in the shadow of failed experiences.
The inefficiencies and collective-action problems beset under the
Articles of Confederation called for empowering a centralized,
44
federal, government. At the same time, however, the despotism
sustained under British rule cautioned for limiting government
45
power.

41. For example, some subfederal governments provide welfare benefits that federal law
does not require, allow day-labor centers for unauthorized workers, offer in-state tuition to
unauthorized immigrants, grant them drivers licenses or other forms of identification, and resist
cooperating with federal immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 582–90 (2008)
[hereinafter Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local] (discussing these protectionist programs).
42. See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 83, 88, 231 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (“The solution [to failures
stemming from the inability of the states to cooperate] lay with the establishment of a more
comprehensive unit of government—a national government . . . .”); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 31 (1998) (explaining the Framers’ support for a
“more vigorous national government that could protect property rights, promote commerce,
establish credit by paying the public debt, and suppress insurrection”).
45. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 44, at 26–31 (identifying colonial British rule as the impetus
for the American revolutionaries’ emphasis on protection of property ownership in
constitutional limits on government power); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered
Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1513–16 (1991) (raising James Madison’s warning that the
accumulation of all governmental powers in one body is the very definition of tyranny);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
13 (1994) (“It is an important truism that the framers were quite skeptical of broad executive
authority, a notion that they associated with the tyrannical power of the King.”).
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The Constitution’s original strategy for repelling tyranny was
structural: Power was dispersed horizontally among the federal
branches (i.e., separation of powers) and vertically between the
federal and state governments (i.e., federalism). In the Federalist
Papers, James Madison famously professed that, together, these
46
structural elements would net a “double security” for liberty. In mind
was a brand of liberty that advanced not only individual autonomy
47
but also political choice. Though the Bill of Rights was later directed
at promoting these values, the structural division of power offered
48
independent prophylactic security. It was a strategy born of two
related concerns: first, that incremental threats to liberty might prove
too difficult to discern in individual cases; and second, that
government power, once accumulated, might prove too difficult to
49
counter.
Towards these ends, the Constitution divides and vests the federal
power in three separate institutions: the legislative power in Congress
50
(which is further subdivided into two houses); the executive power
51
52
in the President; and the judicial power in the courts. This division
of federal power was designed to secure liberty, in part, by diffusing
53
the political influence of private, self-regarding interests. “A faction
might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire
54
power over all three.” To be sure, separating power horizontally was

46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating
that “a double security arises to the rights of the people” because “[i]n the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments”). As Montesquieu wrote: “When the legislative and Executive power are united
in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (1748) (Prometheus ed., 2002).
47. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lynn
A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE
L.J. 75, 135 (2001).
48. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 477 (1991) (discussing
the purposes of prophylactic protections).
49. Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to
keep it from getting out of hand.”).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
51. Id. art. II, § 1.
52. Id. art. III, § 1.
53. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434–36
(1987).
54. Id.
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55

expected to result in some government inefficiency. But the defeat of
“a few good laws” was thought to be “amply compensated by the
56
advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”
Dividing power vertically between the federal and state
governments similarly was intended to advance the political
marketplace. Each level of government could be expected to compete
for public loyalties “by conferring the freedom to choose from among
various diverse regulatory regimes the one that best suits the
57
individual’s preferences.” States could garner popular loyalty not
only from the substance of their laws, but also by affording the public
more accessible outlets for political choice and participation in
58
government. As Roderick Hills explains, “federal regimes allow
groups smaller than a national majority to satisfy their preferences for
public goods, multiply opportunities for political participation, and
59
diffuse power in a way to promote electoral competition.” Again,
though not necessarily efficient, the competition for political favor in
the states provides a critical check against an otherwise unchallenged
60
and potentially overreaching federal government.

55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (acknowledging that “check[s] on
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial”).
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The injury which may
possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of
preventing a number of bad ones.”).
57. Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 139; Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 100 (“[T]he Federalists
understood and emphasized that influence through electoral politics presupposes that state
governments would exist as alternative objects of loyalty to the national government.”).
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (noting that “a greater number of
individuals will expect to rise” into state government); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at
1369.
59. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Sovereignty Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 856 n.152
(1998).
60. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at 1369, 1358 n.42 (“States cannot function as
checks on the power of the central government, or as laboratories of experimental regulation, if
they lack the institutional ability to govern themselves in meaningful ways.”); see also New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps
the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”); Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1448–51 (1987) (“[F]ederalism
enabled the American People to conquer government power by dividing it. Each government
agency, state and national, would have incentives to win the principal’s affections by monitoring
and challenging the other’s misdeeds.”).
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Though the Constitution divides power both horizontally and
vertically, the demarcation of precise boundaries admits of no easy
61
solutions. In the separation of powers context, for example, the
Court has recognized that a certain degree of policymaking inheres in
62
executive action. And, in the federalism context, the Court has
generally forgone trying to delineate spheres of federal and state
63
exclusivity. The flexibility inherent in this imprecision holds
significance along both structural dimensions. Horizontally, it
manifests as power sharing and grabbing that generate far more
federal law than would otherwise exist. Vertically, the absence of
bright constitutional lines tends to invite federal growth in regulatory
fields that might otherwise be repelled by an enclave of state
exclusivity.
The cumulative effect of a qualitatively expansive federal power
and a quantitatively expansive federal law results in a significant
increase in federal-state regulatory overlap. This phenomenon of
modern government foists enormous pressure on the Supremacy
64
Clause, which is the Constitution’s sorting device for the inevitable
65
conflicts between federal and subfederal law.

61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (“Experience has instructed us that no skill
in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient
certainty, its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily
occur in the course of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects.”).
62. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (acknowledging
that a certain degree of lawmaking is inherent in executive action due to its discretionary
nature).
63. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–56 (1985)
(explaining that the limits on Congress’s authority to directly regulate the states was mostly
relegated to the political process); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47
FLA. L. REV. 499, 507 (1995) (noting the “Court’s refusal to use state sovereignty to limit
congressional powers”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 514 (1987) (observing
that the Court in Garcia “abandoned to the federal political process any effort to define the
proper interpenetration of federal and state authority”).
64. David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2012) (“It
is one thing for the Court to embrace a system of ‘concurrent federalism,’ which potentially pits
federal law against state regulatory programs occupying the same field. It is quite another
matter, however, when federal law displaces—rather than merely overlaps—state regulation.”).
65. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088
(2000) (explaining that the “Supremacy Clause only prescribed a constitutional choice of law
rule, one that gives federal law precedence over [directly] conflicting state law” (alteration in
original)).
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Bradford Clark provides an important account of how the
Supremacy Clause mutually reinforces the principles of separation of
66
powers and federalism. As bears repeating, the Supremacy Clause
provides that the “Constitution,” “Laws . . . made in pursuance
67
thereof,” and “Treaties . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.” As
Professor Clark highlights, the text of the Supremacy Clause
68
discriminates as to the types of federal law that can preempt. Of
equal importance, both the drafting history and the constitutional
structure suggest that the procedures for adopting these types of laws
69
were to be the exclusive means for rendering them supreme.
More specifically, as used in the Supremacy Clause, “[t]his
Constitution” refers to the original Constitution adopted in
accordance with Article VII and to subsequent amendments adopted
70
in accordance with Article V. Meanwhile, the Clause’s reference to
“the Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance [thereof]”

66. See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12; Clark, The Procedural
Safeguards, supra note 23.
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. Id.; Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1326.
69. See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1330–31 (analyzing the
procedures for adopting these laws). To be sure, Professor Clark’s interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause is not universally shared. For important critiques, see Thomas Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010); Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of
Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2008). In my estimation, however, the text, context, and
drafting history of the Supremacy Clause strongly support Professor Clark’s understanding for
reasons that he and others have expressed. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional
Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1424–25 (2008);
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007)
[hereinafter Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements]; Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 699, 703
(2008) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure]; Clark, Separation of
Powers, supra note 12; see also Brandon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, supra note 12;
Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 12. In any event, to the extent that the Supremacy
Clause may be interpreted to include unconventional forms of lawmaking, we might still
prefer—on normative grounds—to limit what can qualify. Thus, for example, while we might
make preemptive accommodations for federal common law, see, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), administrative regulations, see, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), and non-treaty executive agreements, see, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003), we need not recognize all forms of federal action as
having preemptive effect. Without canvassing all of the possibilities, this Article’s limited claim
is that nonbinding executive enforcement policies constitutionally cannot—or, short of that,
normatively should not—have preemptive effect. This is not to concede that other forms of
unconventional lawmaking can or should have preemptive effect; it is just to place those issues
beyond the scope of this Article. For additional discussion of these points, see also infra notes
242–47 and 261−63 and accompanying text.
70. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1332–33.
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seemingly refers to “Laws” produced by the procedures set forth in
71
Article I, Section 7. Under these procedures, a bill may “become a
Law” only after traversing the bicameralism and presentment
72
Finally, the Supremacy Clause’s reference to
requirements.
“Treaties” contemplates those made pursuant to the procedures set
73
forth in Article II. Specifically, the Treaty Clause provides that the
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
74
present concur.”
As Professor Clark highlights, each of the procedures for creating
75
supreme law requires the assent of the Senate. And this was no
historical accident; the Senate was designed to represent the states at
76
the national level. Indeed, Professor Clark recounts, “the states
agreed to the supremacy of federal law only on the condition that
they or their representatives in the Senate would have the
opportunity to veto any and all proposals capable of displacing state
77
law.”
These insights factor heavily in the discussion that follows. An
appreciation for the interdimensional relationship between separation
of powers and federalism offers possibilities for safeguarding both. As
further explored in Part III, insisting upon the Constitution’s
prescribed methods for adopting supreme federal law reinforces the
78
states’ political and procedural protection in the legislative process.

71. Id. at 1334. That the phrase “Laws . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” was
most likely intended to refer to statutes is strongly supported by the drafting history. Before
being revised by the Committee of Detail, the phrase in question read: “The Acts of the
Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution . . . shall be the Supreme
law of the several States.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 183 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
73. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1337–38.
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
75. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1339.
76. Id.; see also Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure, supra note 69, at 703.
77. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, supra note 69, at 1601–02 (2007).
78. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000) (“[T]he ultimate political safeguard may be
the procedural gauntlet that any legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of
overcoming legislative inertia.”); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at 1358 (“[A]lmost every
separation of powers issue acquires federalism connotations as well: the more we shift
government authority away from Congress to the federal Executive . . . the less meaningful the
states’ representation in Congress becomes.”); see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note
12, at 1438–39.
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79

In this way, separation of powers safeguards federalism. At the same
80
time, federalism can safeguard separation of powers. Limiting the
class of preemptive federal laws to those expressly contemplated in
the Supremacy Clause puts pressure on the federal political branches
to adhere to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures—at
least when the political branches intend for their policies to have
preemptive effect. Moreover, when such lawmaking procedures are
not followed, foreclosing the preemptive effect of such policies leaves
room for dissenting subfederal action that can spur a congressional or
judicial check upon executive action.
II. HORIZONTAL DOUBT AND THE VERTICAL RESPONSE
The foregoing discussion recounted how our Constitution
prophylactically secures liberty by separating power both horizontally
and vertically. It further provided an account of the interdimensional
relationship between separation of powers and federalism. This Part
now turns to a discussion of how horizontal separation of powers
norms have been threatened or undermined in the immigration
context. Section A directs particular attention to: (1) the Court’s
abdication of any meaningful constitutional review of the federal
political branches’ substantive immigration policies; (2) Congress’s
vast conferral of policymaking power to the Executive; and (3) the
Executive’s potential usurpation of Congress’s lawmaking function
under the auspices of prosecutorial discretion and foreign affairs.
Section B then explains how the latter two threats impact
immigration federalism, as most recently expressed through the
subfederal revolution. The failure of meaningful judicial review is less
relevant to the subfederal response, but will be revisited in Part IV as
a reason to worry about a federal monopoly over immigration
enforcement.

79. See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12 (elaborating on the political
and procedural safeguards of federalism).
80. Jessica Bulman-Pozen has recently described how “cooperative federalism” schemes
that delegate responsibility to states provide more opportunity for states to check executive
action and inaction. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 12, at 462 (“By assigning states a role in
executing federal law, Congress has—often unwittingly—empowered them to provide the sort
of check on executive power that it is often unable, or unwilling, to provide directly.”); see also
Heather K. Gerken & Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009) (discussing how states use power conferred by the federal government as a mean of
resisting federal policy). As developed in Part III, infra, my theory of immigration structuralism
builds on that idea to explain how normalizing immigration preemption doctrine offers states
similar space to promote separation of powers norms.
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A. Immigration Separation of Powers
Federal immigration law is a renowned “oddity” where the
81
“normal rules of constitutional law simply do not apply.” This
constitutional exceptionalism may be ascribed to the amorphous
origins of the federal immigration power. That power has been said to
arise from any number of constitutional sources—some express, some
82
implied—but often not tied to any one in particular. Federal
immigration power has at times even been linked to
83
extraconstitutional sovereignty norms. Though it is now widely
accepted that a federal immigration power exists, the power’s
uncertain wellspring generates ripple effects for separation of powers
(and also for federalism, though that is not this section’s immediate
concern).
This section considers two aspects of immigration separation of
powers: first, as between the political branches and the Court; second,
as between the political branches themselves. The former has been the
84
subject of extensive academic attention, and is thus well-rehearsed.
Less critical attention has focused on the latter, though momentum is

81. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260 [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law]; accord Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (holding that federal authority over
immigration derives from the constitutionally enumerated power to “establish [a] uniform Rule
of Naturalization,” the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the more implicit authority over foreign
affairs (alteration in original)); Adam B. Cox, Essay, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration
Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2007) (remarking on the Court’s “ambiguous
pronouncements about the source of federal immigration authority”); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4.
83. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 609 (1889) (holding that the
doctrine of inherent sovereignty affords the federal government plenary authority over
immigration); accord Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (noting that the federal
immigration power rests, in part, on the government’s “power as sovereign to control and
conduct relations with foreign nations”).
84. For a sampling of this voluminous body of work, see generally Jennifer M. Chacón,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 1827, 1868 (2007); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1998) [hereinafter Chin,
Segregation’s Last Stronghold]; Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration
Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1584−92 (2013); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.
853 (1987); Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 77 (2008); Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 255; Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power]; Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and
Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008).
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85

quickly building.

1. Political vs. Judicial
The Court long ago eschewed any meaningful constitutional
86
review of the political branches’ substantive immigration policies.
Under the so-called “plenary doctrine,” the Court has declared itself
virtually powerless to review even those policies that facially classify
87
by nationality, race, gender, or legitimacy. Early expressions of the
plenary doctrine suggested that the federal power to admit or expel
88
immigrants admitted of no substantive constitutional limit. That is,
the federal immigration power was understood to be
extraconstitutional, thereby unconstrained by the guarantees of
89
liberty otherwise enshrined in the Bill of Rights. More recently,
however, the Court has retreated from this extraconstitutional
reasoning. Instead, the plenary doctrine is now generally conceived as
a species of the political question doctrine, triggered by concern over
90
judicial meddling in foreign policy. This separation of powers

85. For recent treatments of immigration separation of powers questions, see generally
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458
(2009); Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19; Margulies, supra note 19; Cristina M.
Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration
Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010) [hereinafter Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation]; Yoo
& Delahunty, supra note 19. For an earlier treatment, see generally Legomsky, The Making of
United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4.
86. See, e.g., Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 84,
at 550–60 (describing the roots of the plenary power doctrine).
87. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (race); Chae Chan
Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (race); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (gender and legitimacy); see also
Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 255 (“In an undeviating
line of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself powerless to
review even those immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as
race, gender, and legitimacy.”).
88. See generally Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (1889); see also Legomsky, The Making of
United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 274 (“One theory advanced in some of the plenary
power cases, with varying degrees of explicitness, is that the power either to exclude or to
deport aliens is inherent in sovereignty, and that Congress’s exercise of that power is therefore
immune from substantive constitutional constraints.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1372
(1999) (explaining that “[t]he early plenary power cases established a pattern of discourse that
conceptualized immigration control as a matter of national sovereignty”).
89. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 257–58 (detailing the dimensions of
Congress’s plenary power over immigration).
90. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 559 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“Judicial deference in the
immigration context is of special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive
political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81−82 (1976) (“The reasons that preclude
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conception yields a marginally less dangerous—but still sweeping—
federal immigration power. It is marginally less dangerous because
the Court seems willing to take a peek at the substance of federal
91
immigration law. But the residuum of super-deference still produces
irksome judicial countenancing of “official conduct that would never
92
be tolerated against an ordinary backdrop.”
For generations now, the plenary doctrine has been widely
assaulted as an anachronism with little descriptive or normative
93
appeal. To be sure, a conceptual and sometimes real relationship
exists between immigration and foreign affairs. The connection
derives from the effect that immigration decisions have on foreign
nationals. Adverse immigration decisions carry the potential for
94
international tension. Even favorable immigration decisions carry
the potential to undercut foreign policy⎯for example, by undermining
bargaining positions in negotiations with countries whose nationals
95
are affected. Yet as several immigration scholars have explained, the
harbinger of foreign repercussion is no reason for abandoning
meaningful judicial review in the great bulk of cases where foreign
96
policy is not actually implicated or seriously threatened.

judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made
by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.”).
91. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (1977) (noting that the political judgments over immigration
are “largely immune”—and, implicitly not completely immune—from judicial control (quoting
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))).
92. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627,
1629 (1997) [hereinafter Spiro, Learning to Live]; see also Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79–80 (“In the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).
93. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 34 (1990) (“The immigration power should be brought within the fold of
other congressional powers and subjected to the constitutional limits normally applied to those
powers.”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
57, 57 (“Despite the plenary power doctrine’s authority, it has been assailed over the years by
many academics and defended, I think, by none.”).
94. Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 262.
95. Id.; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 965, 991–92 (2004) (describing how immigration policies can impact the United States’
relation with the immigrants’ home countries).
96. See Henkin, supra note 84, at 862 (describing Chinese Exclusion as an exception and “a
relic of a different era”); Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 268 (realizing that
“[o]nly in a few special instances do immigration cases realistically affect foreign policy”).
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As Louis Henkin summarized, the plenary doctrine traces to an
earlier era
in which constitutional restraints were deemed inapplicable to
actions by the United States outside its territory; when orotund
generalities about sovereignty and national security were a
substitute for significant scrutiny of governmental action
impinging on individual rights; [and] when the Bill of Rights had
not yet become our national hallmark and the principle
97
justification and preoccupation of judicial review.

Still, the plenary doctrine remains curiously persistent.
2. Congress vs. the Executive
In the immigration context, the Court has “long glossed over
separation-of-powers questions” pertaining to the division of power
98
among the political branches. Although Congress is our traditional
lawmaking branch, the Executive wields an enormous influence over
immigration policy. This power sharing is attributable to (1) sporadic
claims of inherent executive authority, (2) more so, to express
congressional delegations of discretionary power, but (3) mostly to
what Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez refer to as “de facto
99
delegation.” As they explain, Congress has de facto delegated
immigration authority to the Executive in two ways. Most
significantly, the Executive enjoys primary control over a very sizable
unauthorized population due to the combination of Congress’s
“stringent admissions conditions” and the Executive’s inability to
100
effectively police the border. Moreover, Congress has radically
expanded the grounds by which lawfully admitted immigrants may be
101
The result is that approximately one-third of all
deported.
noncitizens in the United States are removable at the Executive’s
102
option. It is not clear whether Congress intends this result, though
certainly it is within the realm of political possibility. De facto
delegation—intended or not—allows Congress to exude publicly a
tough position on immigration while simultaneously, and more subtly,
103
passing the buck to the Executive.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Henkin, supra note 84, at 862.
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 460.
Id. at 462, 511–14.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529 (“Congress might accrue political benefits from making immigration law on
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Emphatically, my objective here is not to insist that congressional
delegation violates separation of powers. Nor do I mean to suggest
that a court would or should probe deep enough to uncover a
violation. Rather, my more modest suggestion is that congressional
delegations to the Executive threaten separation of powers norms,
insofar as these delegations represent a seismic transfer of
immigration policymaking from Congress to the Executive. In turn,
this shift threatens the very liberties that separation of powers was
intended to secure.
As Professors Cox and Rodriguez explain, de facto delegation
makes it substantively possible for the Executive to alter the
immigration labor force, to permit removable immigrants with
104
criminal convictions to remain in the country, and more. Of equal
concern here, de facto delegation procedurally enables the Executive
to do so without resort to the legislative process—and, indeed, at
105
times in contravention to Congress’s expressed will. Moreover,
Professors Cox and Rodriguez explain, the Executive’s immigration
power is “asymmetrical” insofar as it “operates principally at the back
end of the system, through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
with respect to whom to deport, rather than at the front end of the
106
system, through decisions about whom to admit.” This asymmetry
“can lead to perverse consequences, particularly with respect to the
107
management of unauthorized immigration,” where opportunities for
108
selective enforcement abound.
Of related concern, the accumulation of immigration power in the
Executive renders the power more fickle and potentially more
arbitrary. Executive immigration policy is subject to significant change
109
with each new presidential inauguration. Indeed, the political
moment of a new presidency is not even necessary, as executive policy
can change on a whim even within a President’s tenure. To be sure,
the books even harsher and bear few of the political costs associated with immigration
enforcement efforts.”); cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 733 (2005) (describing Congress’s use of symbolic legislation);
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 514 (2001)
(noting the same potential in the criminal law context).
104. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 464.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 464–65.
108. See Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation, supra note 85, at 1796 (criticizing the
current immigration system’s “excessive prosecutorial discretion”).
109. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 464.
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movements in policy are to be expected and sometimes encouraged.
But here I draw a critical distinction between policy shifts generated
through the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking process, on the one
hand, and policy shifts occasioned though unilateral executive
(in)action, on the other. Because nonbinding executive policymaking
is generally less deliberative and transparent than the legislative
110
process, it is also potentially more arbitrary and dangerous.
Of course, the foregoing separation of powers concerns may
simply be beside the point if there is no constitutionally ordained
division of immigration power among the political branches. That is,
perhaps there are no constitutional limits on what Congress can
delegate or on what the Executive may claim for itself. Such is not
unthinkable given the wisps of extraconstitutionality in the Court’s
111
foundational immigration cases.
The notion of immigration
separation of powers immunity, however, is wildly incompatible with
112
the Court’s seminal decision in INS v. Chadha. There, the Court held
that an immigration statute containing a legislative veto violated
separation of powers because it circumvented the Constitution’s
113
“finely wrought” bicameralism and presentment requirements. Thus,
at minimum, the Court’s earlier musings of an extraconstitutional
immigration power seem to have no purchase on the federal
110. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58 (1996) (“Article I’s precise rules
of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress
the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.”); Rodriguez, Constraint
Through Delegation, supra note 85, at 1801, 1804 (discussing the lack of executive transparency
in prosecutorial discretion as compared to legislative action). The Obama Administration’s
DACA program may be an exception. Both the unveiling and administration of the program
have been remarkably transparent. See Eric Posner, The Imperial President of Arizona, SLATE
(June 26, 2012, 12:04 PM) (noting the transparency around DACA’s unveiling). What is notably
less transparent, however, is the motivation for the program—in particular, whether and to what
extent it owes to political preference or resource constraints. The President himself sent very
mixed messages when he announced the DACA program. See The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration (referring to
the program, at times, as the “right thing to do” for a class of undocumented immigrants who in
fairness do not deserve to be deported, and later noting the administration’s desire to “focus . . .
immigration enforcement resources in the right places”). Apart from President Obama’s own
statements, the program’s timing around the 2012 presidential election suggests that politics was
a motivating factor. Plus, given the resources necessary to implement the program, it is not clear
that government time, money, and energy are being conserved.
111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 477–78 (discussing
Chadha’s implications for separation of powers norms in the immigration context).
113. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (“[T]he prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7
represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”).
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lawmaking process.
Still, to say that separation of powers principles generally apply to
immigration lawmaking does not necessarily foreclose the need for
114
special treatment when foreign affairs are implicated. Nor does it
resolve whether conventional separation of powers norms have been
upset in the ways I have suggested above. Before turning to the
complicating variable of foreign affairs, I begin here with
conventional domestic norms: specifically, in regards to
congressionally delegated power and the executive authority of
prosecutorial discretion.
a. The Delegation Defense
Despite Article I’s vesting of “all” legislative power in Congress,
the Court has long held that Congress may delegate policymaking to
the Executive Branch so long as the statute provides an “intelligible
115
principle” to sufficiently guide the exercise of discretion. It thus may
be argued that delegations clearing this threshold raise no separation
of powers concerns. However, as every student of administrative law
quickly comes to learn, the so-called “nondelegation” doctrine is a
116
misnomer. Virtually nothing fails the intelligible principle test,
117
leaving the breadth of Congress’s delegations virtually unchecked.
Accordingly, reliance on the nondelegation doctrine as a sweeping
defense of the structural concerns raised above rings hollow: The
114. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 95, at 264 (“[E]ven assuming that the president may not
contradict or defy a particular congressional direction, the Court understands that
administration of the immigration laws implicates foreign policy and national security in ways in
which other executive decisions might not.”).
115. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (formulating
the intelligible principle test); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(applying the intelligible principle test); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–75, 379
(1989) (same).
116. That the nondelegation doctrine is notoriously underenforced is a point made by many.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 517 (2003) (describing how the Court’s lax
intelligible principle standard has rendered this limit on administrative discretion essentially
meaningless); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2002)
(noting that “the ban on unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced norm”).
117. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (“[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1241 (1994); Merrill, supra note 69, at 2099 (remarking on the “judicial attitude of great
deference in determining whether any particular statute confers too much discretion” and
observing that the “nondelegation doctrine, while still formally considered part of our structural
Constitution, is effectively unenforceable”).

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

104

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

underenforced nondelegation norm is itself a slippage of separation of
powers.
In any event, even where express congressional delegations justify
executive policymaking, de facto delegations raise very different
concerns. In such cases, the Executive operates outside of Congress’s
written law. Any suggestion that Congress legislatively graces such
action—in wink-and-nod fashion—might be descriptively accurate. To
endorse the practice, however, would be constitutionally nihilistic.
After all, “[w]hat would the enactment of statutory law mean, if
Congress also consciously enabled and encouraged the Executive not
118
to enforce it?”
b. The Inherency Defense
Apart from justifications tied to congressional delegation, it may
be argued that separation of powers norms are not threatened, insofar
as the Executive enjoys inherent immigration authority under the
119
Article II auspices of prosecutorial discretion and foreign affairs.
But, as explained below, these powers do not save all executive
immigration action from doubt.
i. Prosecutorial Discretion
120
Prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context cuts broadly.
It is conventionally understood to encompass “decisions about which
offenses or populations to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and
arrest; whether to detain or to release a noncitizen; whether to initiate
removal proceedings; whether to execute a removal order; and
121
various other decisions.”
Notwithstanding the well-settled

118. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 55); cf. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41 (1983) (discussing the public interest in upholding
legislative compromises).
119. Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 474–76, 492–501 (discussing the inherency
rationale for executive immigration policy); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary
Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2005–2006) (noting that “[t]he executive enjoys its
customary authority not to pursue [immigration] enforcement”).
120. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010) (demonstrating how prosecutorial discretion with
respect to immigration law can be exercised in a broad variety of ways); see also Hiroshi
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842 (2010−2011) [hereinafter
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters] (highlighting that prosecutorial discretion is oftentimes
misused as a “loose synonym” for enforcement discretion more generally).
121. Wadhia, supra note 120, at 244; see also Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law,
supra note 5, at 2047 (discussing the discretionary nature of immigration enforcement);

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

105

foundation of the Executive’s immigration enforcement discretion,
important conceptual limits remain.
At one spectral pole, it is uncontroverted that the Executive can
make prosecutorial decisions in individual cases in any of the above122
referenced categories, as resources or case-specific equities demand.
At the other spectral pole, however, the conventional (though
perhaps not universal) understanding is that the Executive cannot
exercise prosecutorial discretion to make Law in contravention of
123
congressional will. That much, at least, seems clear from the
constitutional command that the President “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed,” as well as from the exacting prescription for
124
lawmaking in Article I, Section 7. Between these outer poles lies a

Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, supra note 119, at 611 (same).
122. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 257
(2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)) (“[T]he president is to
carry out his duties the best he can given the constraints of time, resources, and funding. When
he does this, he fulfills his constitutional obligations.”); Wadhia, supra note 120, at 244–45
(referring to resource constraints and humanitarian concerns as a “two-fold” justification for
prosecutorial discretion); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 48) (“Obviously the
President cannot secure full execution of the laws, if Congress denies to him adequate means of
doing so.”); id. (manuscript at 45) (recognizing that “[b]reach of the Executive’s enforcement
duty might also be excused based on equitable considerations in an individual case (or a small
set of cases”); see also Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 19) (noting that it would be
illogical to hold the President responsible for inaction that is due to congressional
underfunding); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) (stating that the Executive has the appropriate discretion “to set
enforcement priorities and allocate resources to those problems . . . that seem most severe”).
123. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637−38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 4−6) (arguing that presidential
inaction, via prosecutorial discretion or otherwise, can upset separation of powers when such
inaction is in derogation of statutory command); Margulies, supra note 19, (manuscript at 4)
(arguing that, under Justice Jackson’s schematic in Youngstown, DACA cannot be justified as a
lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note
122, at 670 (noting conceptual distinction between exercising discretion to account for resource
constraints, on the one hand, and “refusing to carry out obligations that Congress has imposed
on the Executive, on the other); cf. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut:
Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 711 (1996–1997) (“The
most basic problems of discretion are thus how to define and restrain its abuse without
destroying its non-rule-like character, while maintaining its legitimacy within the legal
community.”).
124. See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Action, supra note 122, at 670 (“Although there will be
difficult intermediate cases, the ‘take Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to
enforce those laws of which it disapproves.”); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at
passim) (offering contextual and historical support for understanding the “Take Care” Clause as
an executive duty); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88 (“In the framework of our
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker.”); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 827 (“A central tenet of
separation-of-powers is that the executive is not a lawmaker.”).
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sizable grey area that both hosts and obscures the conceptual line
between permissible and impermissible exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. Within that grey area—and not always evident on which
side of the line—are systemic executive polices about how to treat
different classes of immigrants or categories of offenses.
It is well beyond my ambition here to develop a comprehensive
model to calibrate exactly when prosecutorial discretion breaches the
conceptual divide between law execution and lawmaking. (The
promise of such a model would likely fail of its own ambition in any
event). Still, there may be use here in sketching some intuitive
125
guides. First, the more broadly or generally a systemic policy applies,
the more it takes on the hue of law. The second variable is motivation.
More specifically, if the systemic policy owes to a lack of resources,
that should factor heavily in favor of permissible discretion. The
Executive, after all, may only be expected to enforce the law using the
resources legislatively made available. By contrast, if systemic
prosecutorial inaction is driven by the Executive’s political or
ideological preference, it tends to feel and act more like law.
As I began with, this approach is far from complete and hardly
satisfying. The variable of scope is necessarily relativistic; i.e., how
broad is too broad? Similarly, most exercises of systemic prosecutorial
discretion are partly motivated by both resource constraints and
reasons of policy, yielding often impenetrable questions of relative
degree. More fundamentally, however, even if the Executive could
accurately and objectively articulate its motivations, it would be naïve
to expect a transparent self-assessment in close cases when it matters
most. Indeed, what makes prosecutorial discretion so potentially
126
arbitrary is that there is no legal requirement for transparency.
Thus, we are left with an admittedly imperfect framework for
discerning the boundaries of permissible enforcement discretion. But
the lack of precision is part of the point. My ambition here is only to
establish that: (1) there is a conceptual line between using
prosecutorial discretion for law execution and lawmaking; (2) certain

125. For other recent attempts, see generally Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at
14−15); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19.
126. See Strauss, supra note 69, at 112 (“[T]he executive is not obliged to express reasons for
its choices either to enforce against one person rather than another, or to emphasize one law
over another in its allocation of governmental resources.”); Sunstein, supra note 122, at 673
(stating that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion “will often be unaccompanied by a record
that a court might examine”).
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exercises of prosecutorial discretion come closer to that line than
others, and indeed, some may cross it; (3) we will not usually know
when that line has been crossed; and (4) we should not expect courts
127
to tell us when it has occurred. In short, without denying the
Executive’s power of prosecutorial discretion, I wish to emphasize
only that the power’s existence does not resolve residual uncertainties
surrounding all of its uses—especially when those uses are systemic.
This residual uncertainty, in turn, will become relevant again later in
assessing how federalism norms might accommodate any such
128
failings.
ii. Foreign Affairs
The President’s constitutionally recognized role in foreign affairs
offers yet another basis for inherent executive power over
129
immigration. That there is a conceptual nexus between immigration
and foreign affairs, however, says nothing about the Executive’s
authority to make immigration law.
The Constitution divides the foreign affairs power, and the bulk of
130
it is vested in Congress. As pertains to immigration, Congress is
vested with the power to establish a “uniform rule of Naturalization,”
to regulate foreign commerce, to provide for the common defense, to
prohibit the migration and importation of persons, and to make all
131
laws necessary and proper for carrying out those powers.
Meanwhile, the Constitution is mostly silent as to the Executive
foreign affairs power. The President has the power to make Treaties,
132
but only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Any executive

127. See Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 26−30) (observing that existing
doctrine and prudential concerns hamstring courts’ ability to serve as a meaningful check
against presidential inaction); Strauss, supra note 69, at 112; cf. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Action, supra note 115, at 669–70 (observing that “[r]eluctance to review inaction has
traditionally been based in part on a set of considerations counseling against judicial usurpation
of the executive function,” but asserting that “if judicial involvement is based on a statutory
violation by the executive, review promotes rather than undermines the separation of powers,
for it helps to prevent the executive branch from ignoring congressional directives”).
128. See infra notes 272–87 and accompanying text.
129. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration
Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 264 n.50 (2011) (“Because the foreign-affairs power
is at least partly in the hands of the president, some authority exists for the notion that the
president has some inherent power in the immigration context.”).
130. Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 975, 984–85 (2001).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 18.
132. Id. art. II, § 2.

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

108

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

foreign affairs lawmaking authority must thus derive from elsewhere.
Though not expressly enumerated, it is well-settled that the
Article II executive power encompasses many significant foreign
affairs functions, most notably developing foreign policy,
communicating with foreign nations, and making non-treaty
international agreements. But to the extent that these functions derive
from the Article II “executive” power, “there is little basis for saying
133
that it includes lawmaking power.” Moreover, nothing in the
Constitution suggests that the Executive’s shaping of foreign policy
may be to the exclusion of Congress. Much less is there a
constitutional suggestion that, in matters involving immigration, the
134
Executive can supplant Congress’s will.
* * *
The foregoing discussion identified some potential failings in
immigration separation of powers. Again, I do not insist upon any
violations. Nor do I expect the courts to so find. Rather, my objectives
in highlighting the potential failings are threefold. First, potential
breakdown between the political branches offers descriptive context
for the subfederal immigration revolution, discussed immediately
below (Part II.B). Second, the potential failings along structuralism’s
horizontal dimension offer normative thrust to a model that favors
135
“compensating adjustments” along the vertical dimension (Part
133. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 912.
134. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 475 (explaining that executive action without
congressional authorization is “in tension with conventional understandings of the separation of
powers”); cf. Mary Fan, Rebellious State Crimmigration Enforcement and the Foreign Affairs
Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1273 (2012) (noting that whatever the Executive’s role in
foreign affairs, it is “subject to the vicissitudes of Congress”).
135. The idea of compensating adjustments is not new, and takes a number of forms. For
discussions and applications, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 135 (describing how moderate changes in circumstance
are used to justify increases in the scope of federal power); Peter McCutchen, Mistakes,
Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the
Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (describing compensating adjustments as a “form
of constitutional damage control”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 421 (1987) (advocating “the commitment to checks and balances through a
system of coordinated review of agency action”); Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422 (2003) (discussing the “second-best idea of
compensating adjustments”); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1748–
62 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism] (discussing compensating adjustments and
the judicial role in structural cases); see also Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
381, 389 (1997) (discussing the “debilitating indeterminacy problems that compensating
adjustments raise”); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2065−67 (2009) (critiquing compensating approaches).
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136

III). Third, the potential separation of powers failings caution
against surrendering to the federal government an immigration
monopoly, given the political branches’ spotty record on civil liberties
in the immigration context and a Court unabashedly willing to defer
(Part IV).
B. The Subfederal Immigration Revolution
Part I described the theoretical relationship between separation of
powers and federalism. This section provides a complementing
practical account; more specifically, it describes how perceived failings
in immigration separation of powers have factored into an
137
unprecedented subfederal response.
To be sure, a number of different theories have been proffered to
explain the subfederal revolution: some tie it to changing
demographic and economic conditions; others to racial bias; and still
138
others to opportunistic politicking. But, whatever the causal mix, the
subfederal immigration revolution is undoubtedly connected to—and
139
principally targeted at—our sizable unlawful population. And, as
described above, that population is largely the product of
underenforced immigration laws.

136. Of course, we might also seek to directly attend to the separation of powers issues by
drawing sharp(er) distinctions between congressional and executive functions. See generally
Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19. But, as explained above and further below, it is both too
difficult and unlikely that the Court will do so. As explained in Part III, preemption doctrine
offers a means for indirectly compensating for potential horizontal failings in a less judicially
intrusive way.
137. See generally Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!:
Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering
Whether “Immigration Regionalism” is an Idea Whose Time has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1 (2010) (discussing the unprecedented nature of subfederal immigration activity); Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1674–75 (2011) (“Immigration law is undergoing an unprecedented
upheaval.”).
138. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground
Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (attributing the subfederal response to racism
and xenophobia, particularly against Latinos); Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights, supra
note 2, at 617 (attributing subfederal movement to changing demographics and racial bias);
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 594 (describing new migration
patterns).
139. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 798 (2008).
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The perception that the Executive is either unwilling or unable to
140
enforce the law has led to subfederal concerns for the rule of law.
More pragmatically, there are many who fear that lapses in rule-oflaw norms will self-perpetuate to generate even more unlawful
migration. As David Martin observes, “frustration with visible
lawbreaking leads states and local governments to experiment with
141
harsh measures meant to discourage illegal migration.”
Fiscal concerns are also generally cited by states and localities as a
motivating force of restrictionist reforms. The costs of unauthorized
immigration are spread unevenly both regionally and vertically
142
among levels of government. Unauthorized immigration imposes
143
costs on public security, transportation, and other local services.
Subfederal governments also must foot the bill for the primary and
secondary education of undocumented children, emergency medical
care, and the incarceration of undocumented immigrants who commit
144
crimes in their jurisdictions. This is not to deny some economic
145
advantage from unlawful immigration. However, as Peter Schuck
explains, a “fiscal mismatch” occurs because most tax revenues
generated by legal and illegal immigrants flow to the federal
government while almost all of the costs are born at the subfederal

140. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 12, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) (explaining that Arizona Senate Bill 1070 was enacted against federal
“non-enforcement of the federal immigration laws” and the Department of Homeland
Security’s alleged “inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the federal immigration laws
effectively”); see also Kris Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to
Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 156–57 (2007) (“Due to ICE’s
inadequate manpower, illegal aliens know that the probability of actually encountering federal
immigration enforcement officers is very low. In this environment, the rule of law has eroded
persistently and pervasively.”).
141. David Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 525, 551 (2007).
142. Huntington, supra note 139, at 805; Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,
supra note 93, at 79.
143. Schuck, supra note 93, at 79–80.
144. Id.
145. For one analysis of the economic benefits of immigration, see Executive Office of the
President, Counsel of Economic Advisers, Immigration’s Economic Impact, Jun. 20, 2007,
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.html
(finding that “immigrants not only fuel the Nation’s economic growth, but also have an overall
positive effect on the income of native-born workers”). For an account of the economic effects
of unlawful immigration, see Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal
Immigration in the United States (Migration Policy Inst. 2009), available at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Hanson-Dec09.pdf (stating that “despite its faults, illegal
immigration has been hugely beneficial to many US employers, often providing benefits that the
current legal immigration system does not”).
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146

level.
Moreover, the fiscal burdens are not spread equally
throughout the nation. Some regions and localities are impacted more
than others depending on border proximity, national migration
147
patterns, and regional enforcement priorities.
The perception (or fear) that the federal government may be
intentionally leveraging the fiscal mismatch only adds fuel to the fire.
Subfederal initiatives to recoup costs from the federal government
148
have come up short both politically and judicially. Thus, when efforts
at comprehensive immigration reform stalled in Congress about five
years ago, subfederal governments rallied to pass regulations that
increased enforcement and restricted benefits to unauthorized
149
immigrants.
Behind these restrictionist measures is a philosophy of “attrition
150
through enforcement.” The idea is that unlawful immigrants will
“self-deport” as the “risks of detention or involuntary removal go up,
and the probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment
151
goes down.” The subfederal restrictionist movement is also the
platform for two politically-backed messages: the first is an

146. PETER SCHUCK, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL
NATION 350 (2009); see also Huntington, supra note 139, at 805 (examining the uneven
distribution of costs among levels of government).
147. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1708 (noting that the fiscal mismatch “harms
some states more than others”).
148. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
California has no enforceable right to federal reimbursement for the costs involved in
incarcerating illegal aliens); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
claims “seeking federal reimbursement [for immigration-related expenses] to be nonjusticiable
and lacking in merit”); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1996) (denying
New Jersey reimbursement for expenses incurred by the state for educating illegal immigrants);
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1996) (characterizing as “baseless” New York’s
claims that the Federal Government forced the State to incur costs for incarcerating illegal
aliens); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Florida’s
claims alleging unconstitutional federal coercion with respect to costs associated with illegal
aliens to be “nonjusticiable political questions”).
149. For statistical accounts, see State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/
state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (reporting
the introduction of more than 7000 state immigration-related bills and the passage of more than
1000 state laws and resolutions); see also Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised
by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010) (offering more descriptive
accounts); Scott A. Gray, Note, Federalism’s Tug of War: Alabama’s Immigration Law and the
Scope of State Power in Immigration, 64 ALA. L. REV. 155 (2012) (same).
150. See, e.g., S. B. 1070, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (“The legislature declares that
the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy . . . to discourage
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens . . . .”); see generally Kobach, supra note 140.
151. Kobach, supra note 140, at 156.

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

112

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

unwelcoming message directed at unlawful immigrants; the second is
a contingently welcoming message directed at the federal
152
government—fix the problem or we will.
III. IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM
For now, at least, not much has been accomplished at the federal
153
level to fix the problem of unlawful immigration. At the same time,
the federal administration has judicially lobbied to preserve a federal
154
monopoly over immigration enforcement. More specifically, the
administration has taken the extraordinary measure of suing to enjoin
subfederal restrictionist measures on preemption grounds, arguing
that these initiatives are preempted by congressional statutes and/or
executive enforcement policies.
The disjunctive “or” was typified in several of the administration’s
challenges to Arizona’s S.B. 1070, heard by the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. United States. More specifically:
• Section 3 of S.B. 1070 makes unlawful the “willful failure
to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in
155
violation of” federal registration laws. The administration
argued that this section was field preempted, in part,
because the State cannot “claim the right to punish aliens
who are not registered but who the Executive Branch has
decided not to prosecute based on important

152. See, e.g., Press Release, Speaker Hubbard Responds to Effort to Overturn New
Immigration Law (July 8, 2011) (“If the federal government won’t enforce its own laws and
protect Alabama, we must protect ourselves.”); Press Release, SC on the Brink of Passing
Arizona-Style Illegal Immigration Law (June 21, 2011) (“If Washington refuses to effectively
support our law enforcement officers by enforcing immigration laws, it is left up to the states to
stand up and do what is right.”).
153. Though deportation levels are reportedly at an all-time high, the 400,000 or so per year
that are removed is but a very small fraction of the unlawfully present population. See Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Annual Report, Immigration
Enforcement Actions: 2011 (Sept. 2012) (providing deportation statistics). It also bears noting
that the removal statistics may be inflated as compared to prior years due to variances in the
way removals have been counted. See Steven Dinan, Deportation Statistics Said to be Inflated,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 2012/aug/23/deportationstatistics-said-to-be-inflated/.
154. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellants at 6, Arizona v. United States, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645)
[hereinafter Brief for Michigan] (deploring the Executive Branch’s challenge to Arizona Senate
Bill 1070 as seeking to prolong a “regulatory scheme whereby the Executive branch may
continue to selectively enforce—or selectively not enforce—the laws enacted by Congress”).
155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1509(A) (West 2013); see also 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1304(e),
1306(a) (West 2013) (federal registration laws incorporated by reference).
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considerations consistent with the INA.” The Court
agreed. Though principally focused on Congress’s intent,
the Court also endorsed the administration’s enforcement
argument, stating that, were Section 3 “to come into force,
the State would have the power to bring criminal charges
against individuals for violating a federal law even in
circumstances where federal officials . . . determine that
157
prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 provides that a state officer, “without
a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable
cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public
offense that makes [him] removable from the United
158
States.” The federal administration argued that this
section was obstacle preempted, in part because it
“empowers state and local officers to pursue and detain a
person . . . without regard to federal priorities or even
159
specific federal enforcement determinations.” Again, the
Court agreed, explaining that the state law “could be
exercised without any input from the Federal Government
about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case,”
thus “allow[ing] the State to achieve its own immigration
160
policy.”
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires state officers to make a
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration
status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some
other non-immigration related basis if “reasonable
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
161
The
unlawfully present in the United States.”
administration argued that Section 2(B) was preempted
because in every instance it “‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment’ of the federal requirement of
cooperation and the full effectuation of the enforcement
judgment and discretion Congress has vested in the

Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 15.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–3883(A)(5) (West 2013).
Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 53.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2013).
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162

Executive Branch under the INA.”
“By insisting
indiscriminately on enforcement in all cases,” the
administration claimed, Section 2(B) forbids subfederal
officers from “adhering to the enforcement judgments and
163
discretion of the federal Executive Branch.” This time,
164
however, the Court was not convinced. Though the court
recognized that Section 2(B) “does not allow state officers
to consider federal enforcement priorities in deciding
whether to contact ICE about someone they have
detained,” this was of little significance since Congress
statutorily “encouraged the sharing of information about
165
possible immigration violations.”
Of course, there is no dispute that congressional statutes preempt
subfederal laws when a sufficient conflict exists. Congress may also
statutorily preempt the field of immigration enforcement, should
166
Congress deem it appropriate to do so. But, as I argue in this Part,
the very availability of these legislative outlets cautions against
allowing nonbinding executive policies to create preemptive conflicts
that otherwise may not exist. As reflected above, the Arizona Court
sent mixed messages on this score and did so without sensitivity to
167
separation of powers norms. The Court’s jurisprudence outside of
162. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 50 (citations omitted) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also id. at 16 (stating that the administration welcomes
subfederal assistance, “provided that they work ‘cooperat[ively]’ with federal officers toward
the goals and priorities set by the Executive Branch, as Congress has specified in the INA itself”
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006))).
163. Id.
164. See generally David Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. 41 (2012) (noting a
potential inconsistency in the Court’s treatment of the administration’s enforcementpreemption argument). For thoughtful attempts to reconcile the Court’s potentially inconsistent
holdings in Arizona, see id.; Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 29–
30).
165. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2496; see also 8 U.S C.A. § 1644 (West 2013) (instructing that “no
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or
receiving from [ICE] information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an
alien in the United States.”).
166. Of course, it will not always be clear whether Congress intends exclusive federal
enforcement. Still, it can be inferred based on the same tools that courts normally look to in
discerning Congress’s intent—e.g., statutory text, context, and legislative history (for those so
inclined). Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (holding that
“clear evidence” exists to support the idea that Congress intended for the Medical Devices
Amendment to be “enforced exclusively by the Federal Government”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (reasoning that in order to determine whether or not
Congress intends to have exclusive enforcement power over a federal statute, courts must look
to the “statute as a whole and identif[y] its purpose and intended effects”).
167. At times the Arizona Court stressed Congress’s intent, and at other times the
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the immigration context suggests a similar ambivalence or inattention
168
to whether nonbinding executive policies can preempt state law.
Unsettled questions thus persist over which government institution
has the relative power to do what. In addressing that question, this
Part argues in favor of an interdimensional approach that utilizes
preemption doctrine to directly safeguard federalism and to indirectly
169
safeguard separation of powers.
A. Safeguarding Federalism
For better or worse, Congress has not directly responded to the
subfederal restrictionist initiatives at the center of the debate. In a
recent
account,
Pratheepan
Gulasekaram
and
Karthick
Ramakrishnan attributed this failing mostly to the work of a minority
coalition actively seeking to block legislation reform for the very
170
purpose of justifying and normalizing subfederal self-help measures.
administration’s enforcement priorities. See supra notes 155−60 and accompanying text. Justice
Alito, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arizona, rightly distinguished between
Congress’s and the Executive’s policies—making plain that only the former could have
preemptive effect. The Arizona majority opinion, however, seemed to place little if any weight
on this distinction. Posner, supra note 110 (observing that the Arizona majority found certain
provisions of S.B. 1070 preempted, not because it conflicts with federal law, but because it
“conflicts with the president’s policy”).
168. Compare Buckman, 531 U.S. 341 (holding that state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims
were conflict preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, owing in part to the
disruption that such claims would have on the federal administration’s enforcement of the Act),
with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (rejecting claim that
nonbinding executive foreign-commerce policies preempted state law). Since Buckman was
cited approvingly in Arizona, see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502–03, it is worth pausing to consider
Buckman’s relevance to immigration enforcement preemption. As an initial matter, Buckman
did not raise or address the type of separation of powers concerns at play in the immigration
preemption context because there was no finding that the agency was underenforcing fraud on
the agency, much less on a systemic scale. See generally Buckman, 531 U.S. 341. In any event,
the Buckman Court seemed to vacillate between two views. At times the Court stressed how the
statutory scheme preempted the state cause of action. See, e.g., id. at 352 (finding “clear
evidence that Congress intended” that the statutory scheme be “enforced exclusively by the
Federal Government” (emphasis added)). At other times, however, the Court suggested that
preemption obtained because the state cause of action conflicted with the administration’s
“responsibility to police fraud consistently with [its] judgment and objectives.” Id. at 350.
Undoubtedly, both views played a role in the Court’s decision. Still, it is unclear whether the
finding of conflict with the administration’s enforcement discretion would have been sufficient
to trigger preemption without also finding that Congress “clearly” intended that discretion to be
exclusive. Id. at 352.
169. These ideas are also applicable beyond the immigration context, but immigration is my
principal focus here.
170. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration
Federalism: A Reappraisal, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2013) [hereinafter Gulasekaram
& Ramakrishnan, A Reappraisal]; Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The
Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431 (2013) [hereinafter
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Be that as it may, Congress has not enacted any ex post laws that
171
expressly preempt or save the subfederal regulations at issue. In
seeking to resolve the putative federal-state conflicts, courts are thus
guessing at what Congress may have intended in pre-existing federal
172
statutes. To be sure, this juristic exercise is not unique to
immigration; courts are often tasked with reading the tea leaves of
173
Congress’s preemptive intent (and a usually fictitious one at that).
The plaguing question, however, is whether special substantive or
methodological rules apply—or should apply—in the immigration
preemption context. Though the Court has sent mixed signals, the
general call from the academy seems to resound in favor of special
174
preemption rules. But, as I argue here, we should insist instead on
175
normalizing the analysis. Special rules in favor of immigration
preemption unnecessarily and improvidently threaten the libertyenhancing values of federalism. This concern is only exacerbated by

Ramakrishnan & Gulasekeram, The Importance of the Political].
171. Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–02 (“[T]here is no doubt that Congress may withdraw
specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption
provision.”).
172. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492; Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968
(2011).
173. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256 [hereinafter Young, The Ordinary
Diet] (“[F]requent ambiguities in Congress’s preemptive intent afford the courts an opportunity
to be more than just a mouthpiece for federal authority.”); see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption,
86 VA. L. REV. 225, 277 (2000) (describing judicial attempts at identifying preemptive intent as
“imaginative reconstruction”).
174. For a non-exhaustive sampling, see Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of
State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 580–81
(2009) (arguing that state and local governments should not regulate immigration); Michael A.
Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35
VA. J. INT’L L. 217, 219–20 (1994) (resisting the claim that states should have a greater role than
they currently do in regulating immigration); Pham, supra note 95, at 967 (arguing “that the
immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly”); Michael
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection,
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 500 (2001) [hereinafter Wishnie, Laboratories of
Bigotry] (arguing that “Congress’s 1996 effort to devolve its federal immigration power is
constitutionally impermissible”). For a minority but growing academic position in favor of
normalizing immigration federalism, see generally Huntington, supra note 139 (challenging the
constitutional mandate of federal exclusivity over immigration); Rodriguez, The Significance of
the Local, supra note 41, at 571 (arguing that “immigration regulation should be included in the
list of quintessentially state interests”); Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, supra
note 93 (making the case for a more robust role for states, in certain areas of immigration
policy); Peter J. Spiro, In an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1994)
[hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties] (arguing that the presumption of federal control over
immigration no longer prevails).
175. For related projects in normalizing immigration federalism, see, for example,
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41; Huntington, supra note 139.

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

117

the potential failings in separation of powers outlined in Part II.
As Ernest Young explains, “the enumerated limits of Congress’s
powers now play an extremely limited role in preserving the federal
176
balance.” Congress is generally free to regulate almost all aspects of
daily life, resulting in a federalist system predominantly characterized
177
by concurrent federal-state jurisdiction. The Supremacy Clause is
the principal instrument for managing that regulatory overlap, where
the federalism inquiry shifts from what “Congress can do” to what
178
“Congress has done.” Enormous structural pressure thus comes to
bear on preemption doctrine. The less forgiving the doctrine is for
conflicts, the more states are squeezed of regulatory autonomy. In
turn, as the states’ autonomy deflates, so too does their capacity to
check and counterbalance federal action. Because preemption
179
doctrine may be federalism’s last viable stronghold, Professor
Young suggests approaching preemption questions in “ways that
cohere with the broader concerns of constitutional federalism
180
doctrine.”
These ideas translate in important ways for the ongoing
subfederal immigration revolution. Insofar as the Court’s federalism
doctrine has relegated state protection to the federal lawmaking
process, it becomes all the more “critical that the Court fashion
meaningful limits [1] on the preemptive scope of the legislation that
Congress does enact and [2] on the ability of nonlegislative federal
181
actors to extend that scope.” Yet, in the immigration context,
precisely the opposite threatens to take hold: Federal statutes are

176. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306.
177. William W. Buzbee, Federalism Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98, 101 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008) (“Congress has
repeatedly chosen to create regulatory schemes that call on a role for federal, state, and
sometimes even local governments.”); Robert Schapiro, From Dualism To Polyphony, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION
33, 41 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008) (“Since 1937, overlapping state and federal regulation has
become the norm, for many, if not most, subjects.”).
178. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 321; see also Young, Executive
Preemption, supra note 12, at 873 (“Preemption doctrine is a particularly important vehicle for
promoting balance between national and state authority.”).
179. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306; see also Garrick B. Pursley,
Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 513 (2010) (“[P]reemption may be the most
important issue for modern federalism theory because it reallocates regulatory authority
between the national and state governments.”).
180. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306.
181. Id. at 280.
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expansively read to preempt state law, while nonlegislative executive
policies are recognized as a conflict-generating preemptive source.
Though this Article is mostly focused on executive preemption, the
discussion below detours to contextualize that issue within
immigration preemption doctrine more generally.
1. Federal Exclusivity Principle
It is now quite settled that the immigration power is exclusively
182
federal. Yet nothing in the Constitution expressly says so. Indeed,
our country’s first hundred years was characterized by state (not
183
federal) immigration regulation. It was not until the close of the
Nineteenth Century that federal exclusivity began to take hold in the
184
Still—and critically—the exclusivity of the federal
field.
immigration power is definitionally contingent under existing Court
precedent. Specifically, the Court has narrowly defined “immigration”
laws to encompass regulations governing the admission and expulsion
185
of noncitizens. Meanwhile, beyond those regulatory categories,
federal and subfederal governments share concurrent authority over
186
matters of “alienage,” which are residually defined as laws that
187
touch upon noncitizens but do not amount to “immigration.”
Alienage laws are generally directed at the rights and burdens of
noncitizens within the country’s interior. Common examples include

182. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,
81–83 (2002) (noting that “[t]he constitutional text does not expressly address authority to
regulate immigration”); Huntington, supra note 139, at 812 (outlining the implied sources of the
constitutional power); Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 611
(“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government explicitly given exclusive power over
immigration.”).
183. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) [hereinafter Neuman, The Lost Century] (investigating pre-1875
immigration regulation).
184. See id. at 1886–93 (discussing the emergence of federal exclusivity in the field of
immigration).
185. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of
aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . .”); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude
aliens—is vested solely in the Federal government.” (citations omitted)); see also DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (defining immigration law per se as “a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country”).
186. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 139, at 799 (“[S]tates and localities have some
authority to enact alienage laws . . . .”).
187. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation
of Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 259–61, 263–64, 269 (2012) (defining
“alienage” in opposition to “immigration”).
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noncitizens’ eligibility for social welfare programs and selected
occupations, limitations on noncitizens’ ability to own land, and
188
noncitizen tax liabilities.
The conceptual divide between “immigration” and “alienage” laws
generates two levels of sorting, both central to preemption. The first
sorting involves the placement of subfederal regulations into the
“immigration” or “alienage” bucket. Those falling in the former are
thought to be constitutionally (or, “structurally”) preempted under
189
the exclusivity principle. Meanwhile, those falling in the alienage
bucket are subject to the more conventional conflict-sorting work of
190
the preemption doctrine. Notorious complications attend both
sorting functions.
In regard to structural preemption, the conceptual divide between
immigration and alienage laws is obscured in application. As
explained by Cristina Rodriguez, “alienage classifications shade into
immigration controls” insofar as subfederal policies that “dole out
relatively negative or positive treatment” to noncitizens can influence
191
migration decisions both nationally and subnationally. As similarly
articulated by Adam Cox, “every rule that imposes duties on
noncitizens . . . potentially influences noncitizens’ decisions about
whether to enter or depart the United States . . . and potentially
192
influences the way in which resident noncitizens live.” Many of the
subfederal revolutionary laws at issue highlight this tension:
Restrictionist laws embodying the “attrition-through-enforcement”
philosophy are purposefully designed to encourage the selfdeportation of unauthorized immigrants; meanwhile, subfederal
protectionist laws that provide sanctuary and benefits to immigrants
193
offer a sense of welcome. Thus, though potentially dispositive,

188. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 256 (describing alienage laws); see
generally A. PETER MUTHARIKA, THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1981) (2 vols.).
189. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 813–14 (discussing structural preemption).
190. Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 261.
191. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 618.
192. Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 343
(2008).
193. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 618; see also Anil
Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After Sept. 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION,
INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 181,
183 (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008) (observing that “non-U.S. citizens
are seeking and finding protection in state capitols and city halls” and that “[i]n some instances
they are finding greater concern for rights and liberties in these locales than they have in
Washington”).
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characterizing subfederal regulations as either “immigration” or
“alienage” is frustrated by the very nature of the inquiry and by the
inescapable truth that subfederal regulations are usually a bit of
194
both.
For regulations directed at unlawful immigrants, the Supreme
Court has generally resolved doubts over this threshold sorting
195
function in favor of the states. For example, in the landmark case
196
DeCanas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California state law that
197
criminalized the hiring of unauthorized immigrants. Though the
Court noted that the “power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably” an exclusive federal power, it also explained that a
state law’s “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration”
does not render it “a constitutionally proscribed regulation of
198
immigration.” And, more recently in Arizona and Chamber of
199
the Court functionally reinforced this
Commerce v. Whiting,
principle when it treated Arizona’s restrictionist regulations as
alienage laws notwithstanding the incidental migration effects these
200
laws likely have on noncitizens. Indeed, the Court in Arizona
approached S.B. 1070 as alienage law notwithstanding the bill’s
legislatively expressed intent to make self-deportation the “public
201
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.”

194. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1053–57 (1994) (“[T]o characterize the law [as either immigration or
alienage] is to beg the question . . . .”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage,
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994) (arguing that a distinction
between immigration law and alienage law is “more formal than real” because of the overlap in
practice).
195. For subfederal regulations impacting lawfully present immigrants, the Court seems to
be far less deferential to states—so much so that it is probably fair to imply a presumption
against the states. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10−11 (1982) (finding preemption and holding
invalid the University of Maryland’s policy of denying in-state status to non-immigrant aliens
who hold valid G-4 visas); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (holding that
state policies that deny welfare benefits to lawfully present resident aliens encroach on exclusive
federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37 (1915)
(finding an Arizona statute imposing limits on the employment of lawful residents to be
preempted by federal law).
196. 424 U.S. 351 (1975).
197. See generally id.
198. Id. at 355–56.
199. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
200. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968.
201. S.B. 1070, § 1, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (“The legislature declares that the
intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local
government agencies in Arizona.”).
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2. Curbing the Shadow of Federal Exclusivity
To the extent that subfederal laws are sorted into the alienage
bucket, the next sorting function determines whether—in the zone of
concurrent federal-state jurisdiction—subfederal laws are trumped or
displaced by conflicting federal law. This sorting provides an
opportunity for conventional applications of the preemption doctrine.
202
Yet here, the exclusivity principle continues to cast a shadow.
A strong commitment to federal exclusivity over immigration
leads to heavy doses of skepticism toward any subfederal
203
restrictionist measure relating to noncitizens. That is because, as
204
noted, almost all such laws impact migration decisions at some level.
This skepticism, in turn, has led some courts and commentators to
205
“place a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption.” The shadow of
exclusivity also makes obstacle and field preemption more
206
capacious. Further, the exclusivity principle tends to obscure the

202. See Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 259–60, 274–76; Huntington, supra note 139, at
792 (“[C]oncluding that the Constitution precludes state and local authority over pure
immigration law casts a long shadow on any state or local conduct concerning immigration, even
conduct that falls short of pure immigration law.”); Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local,
supra note 41, at 62. This shadowing effect was typified most recently in United States v.
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (characterizing Alabama as seeking to exercise
“expulsion power” through a provision of its immigration law). Kerry Abrams also suggests that
this dynamic was at play in Arizona in a way that allowed the Court to avoid “the thorny
question of the scope of the Executive’s power in the immigration context.” See Kerry Abrams,
Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 606 (2013).
203. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 826 (“If we think authority over pure immigration
law is structurally committed to the federal government alone, then we are deeply skeptical of
any state and local conduct related to immigration and aliens . . . .”).
204. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
205. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (noting, but arguing
against, that approach). For thumb-on-the-scale approaches, see, for example, Ingrid v. Eagly,
Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749,
1783−84 (2011) (arguing that Arizona is functionally regulating immigration law and policy);
Fan, supra note 134, at 1273, 1275, 1277; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra
note 120, at 1858 (“For the purpose of preemption analysis, it is essential to recognize that the
practical consequences of a state or local decision to arrest a potentially removable noncitizen is
the making of immigration law itself.”); see also Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of
Dual Federalism, NOMOS LIV: LIBERTY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Young, The Puzzling Persistence] (noting that the Court in Arizona
“stressed ordinary preemption principles, not doctrines of federal exclusivity, although it does
seem fair to say that the Court applied those doctrines with a pro-preemption thumb on the
scale”).
206. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (“Because it has
become so enmeshed in the courts’ doctrinal rhetoric, exclusivity has given rise to very strong
versions of obstacle and field preemption according to which states are not regarded as having
meaningful interests in controlling immigration.”); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that three sections of S.B. 1070 were likely preempted). But cf.
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Supremacy Clause’s limiting prescriptions. Many—including the
federal administration—suggest that the Executive’s enforcement
discretion can itself suffice to preempt state law or may otherwise
207
shape ex post the preemptive scope of congressional enactments.
The cumulative effect is (1) a type of presumption in favor of
preemption; (2) a Court less tolerant of federal-state conflict; and (3)
an expansion of the types of conflicts (to wit, nonbinding executive
policies) that will count toward preemption.
For those that favor a subfederal immigration role, one possible
doctrinal response to the shadowing effect of the exclusivity principle
208
is to eviscerate exclusivity itself. That is, for any number of related
reasons, we might simply take a sledgehammer to the exclusivity
canon. First, the Constitution does not obviously require federal
exclusivity; indeed, both the federal and state levels of government
209
acted otherwise for the first century of our history. Second, the
exclusivity principle was conceived in an era when there was a
“perceived need to have a single, strong sovereign manage foreign
210
affairs.” But as Peter Spiro and others have argued, the foreign
affairs rationale for exclusivity is a historically contingent artifact with
211
far less purchase today. Third, exclusivity is not functionally
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (upholding LAWA, and noting that “implied preemption analysis
does not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with
federal objectives” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. See, e.g., Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 260; Fan, supra note 134, at 1272–73; Pham,
supra note 95, at 967–68.
208. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 572–73 (“Federal
exclusivity was neither a matter of original practice, nor is it specified in the Constitution.”); see
also Huntington, supra note 139, at 794 (“Although conventional wisdom embraces a structural
preemption view of federal immigration authority, the text of the Constitution, the institutions
created by the Constitution, and historical practice all support a statutory preemption view.”);
Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 155 (arguing that exclusivity is no longer necessary
in a world where subfederal actors are gaining increased recognition).
209. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 572, 611.
210. Id. at 572.
211. See, e.g., Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 134 (“To the extent that foreign
relations no longer remains an exclusive federal responsibility, the states should be afforded
substantially greater latitude to deal with illegal immigration as a local problem.”); id. at 171
(“Subfederal activity in the area [of immigration], however, is no longer likely to compromise
national interests.”); Young, The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 205, at 44 (“The persistent
nostalgia for exclusive zones of national power over areas like foreign affairs or immigration,
then, remains puzzling.”). For similar expressions not addressed directly at immigration, see, for
example, Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L REV.
1617, 1674 (1997) (“To the extent that central governments are unable or unwilling to redress
local needs and interests, state and local governments have been doing so unilaterally in both
the economic and political realms.”); Julian Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J.
2380, 2414 (2006) (describing “an emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy characterized
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212

necessary. Canada and Germany, for example, allow their respective
213
subnational units to control certain aspects of immigration. Fourth,
our existing regulatory landscape eschews federal exclusivity:
Congress increasingly devolves immigration-related authority to
subfederal governments and subfederal governments increasingly
214
regulate the affairs of noncitizens. Finally—and most critically—
abandoning the exclusivity principle would not absolve the federal
government of its primacy in immigration. Congress can always trump
215
or displace subfederal law as it deems appropriate to do so.
In my estimation, this is a formidable assault that well serves the
ultimate objective of safeguarding federalism. But completely
discarding the exclusivity principle may be unnecessarily ambitious. In
the words of the Court, exclusive federal control over immigration
“has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial
216
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.” My
approach here is thus more tailored and modest: it honors the
principle of exclusivity but limits its gravitational reach. The reasons
outlined above for abolishing exclusivity work equally well for this
more limited purpose, without upsetting foundational precedent.

by governors exercising independent decision-making power over matters affecting the foreign
policy of the entire United States”); see also, e.g., Brian Hocking, Introduction to FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 1, 3 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) (“The notion of a hierarchy
of political authority, with central government acting as the effective gatekeeper between
national communities and their international environment, is outdated” because of “changes in
the domestic and international environments.”).
212. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 816 (“[T]he institutional structure of the
Constitution does not require federal exclusivity, as a functional matter.”).
213. Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 183, at 1840 n.34 (observing that federal
exclusivity “is neither natural nor inevitable in United States federalism or in federalism
generally, as illustrated by Canada and Germany, where federal sub-units still have immigration
responsibilities”); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 122 (arguing that federal
exclusivity “is not a structural necessity” for the purposes of foreign relations).
214. Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1600–13 (discussing how congressional devolution to states
has loosened the federal grip on exclusivity); see also Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local,
supra note 41, at 610 (asserting that the contemporary practice of states undermines the notion
of federal exclusivity).
215. Huntington, supra note 139, at 792; Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra
note 41, at 572, 620; Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 123.
216. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
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a. Presumption in Favor of Preemption?
As noted, one shadowing effect of the exclusivity principle is that
it might place a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption when
217
Congress’s intent is unspecified or ambiguous. This approach finds
theoretical support in the idea that Congress legislates against the
backdrop of exclusivity, and thus presumptively intends to displace
218
subfederal law in the absence of countervailing evidence. As Viet
Dinh explains, “[t]he background context against which Congress
legislates may change in ways that make federal displacement of state
219
law not an extraordinary but an expected action.”
In the immigration context, however, the exclusivity principle is
both empirically and normatively suspect as a background legislative
convention. First, as noted, Congress has increasingly devolved power
220
to the states to cooperate in immigration enforcement and to make
221
localized decisions about welfare rights and benefits. Moreover,
Congress has increasingly incorporated state crime and punishment as
222
grounds for excluding and deporting noncitizens. This legislative
behavior undermines any empirical claim that Congress believes (or
intends) that the power to regulate immigrants is invariably federal.

217. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (“[T]he availability
of constitutional preemption, and its statutory corollary of field preemption, leads courts to
define conflict between state and federal laws broadly and to put a thumb on the scale in favor
of preemption.”).
218. Id. at 623; see also Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political,
supra note 170, at 1442 (“[I]n the case of immigration policy, the status quo of legislative
inaction is not the same as having a blank policy slate on immigration.”).
219. Dinh, supra note 65, at 2101.
220. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g) (West 2013) (specifying immigration enforcement functions
that may be delegated to subfederal officials).
221. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, §§ 5301–04, 5306, 5562–63, 111
Stat. 251 (1997); see also Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1586 (discussing the devolution of “federal
power to the states to deny benefits to immigrants”).
222. See Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1593 (explaining how “state statutory definitions of crime
play a major part in determining whether a federal deportability ground will apply to a
conviction”). For some of the federal law’s expansion of crime-related grounds for deportation,
see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110
Stat. 1214, 1277–78 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (expanding
“aggravated felony” to include certain non-violent crimes); Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (expanding “aggravated felony” definition to
include certain lesser crimes); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104
Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (amending definition of
“aggravated felony” to include a “crime of violence”); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Drug
Kingpin Act), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (defining “aggravated felony” deportation grounds to include
crimes of murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking).
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In any event, it is quite beside the point whether Congress actually
legislates with the exclusivity principle in mind, or even whether for
normative reasons we should presume Congress to be doing so. An
affirmative answer to either suggestion would only establish that
Congress intends to preempt state immigration laws—i.e., laws
concerning the admission and expulsion of noncitizens—which is the
223
outer limit of the Court’s exclusivity principle. As a background
legislative convention, therefore, the exclusivity principle should do
no additional work beyond what it affords during the first sorting
function of structural preemption.
Both empirically and normatively, it would seem that if any
interpretive canon is to apply in the zone of concurrent jurisdiction it
should be the conventional presumption against preemption—a
judicially described “cornerstone” of federalism in effect during the
224
enactment periods of the immigration statutes at issue. The effect of
the anti-preemption presumption resolves doubts about Congress’s
intent in favor of the states, thus placing a greater burden on Congress
225
to actually decide issues of preemption. Though not speaking to
immigration in particular, Professor Clark argues that the canon’s
effect of channeling preemption decisions to Congress—and away
from the courts—is consistent with, if not required by, the Supremacy
226
Clause. Roderick Hills also defends the canon on normative
grounds, explaining how the anti-preemption presumption serves to
effectuate “an open and vigorous [preemption] debate on the floor of

223. See supra notes 185−87 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the exclusivity
principle).
224. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that there is a
presumption against federal preemption of state laws unless “that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress” (citations omitted)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)
(describing the presumption as a “cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence”). But cf.
Dinh, supra note 65, at 2096 (arguing that the “constitutional text, structure, and history does
not support the application of the [presumption] in all contexts”); Nelson, supra note 173, at 291
(noting that it would be improper for courts to apply an “artificial presumption against
preemption” to constrain “federal statutory provisions that plainly do manifest an inten[t] to
supplant state law” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
225. See, e.g., Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 275 (describing the presumption
against preemption as a “thumb on the scale representing the value of state autonomy”); see
also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 36 (2008) (describing
how clear-statement rules enforce constitutional values by increasing the enactment costs of
particular types of legislation).
226. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1427–29 (claiming that the clearstatement requirement essentially requires Congress to decide preemption questions).
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227

Congress.” William Eskridge favors the presumption because it
offsets delegation pathologies generated by the cumbersome
228
legislative process. Meanwhile, Professor Young endorses the antipreemption presumption as a “compensating adjustment” for
federalism, to help offset the Court’s general reluctance to police or
229
limit the bounds of federal power.
My theory of immigration structuralism builds on these ideas to
explain why the anti-preemption presumption should apply in the
immigration context (or, at least why a presumption in favor of
preemption should not). In particular, the anti-preemption
presumption offers a type of compensating adjustment not only for
federalism, but also for potential failings along the separation of
powers dimension. As explained in Part II, the Executive’s capacious
policymaking discretion over the sizable undocumented immigrant
230
population arises from Congress’s de facto delegation. It is a
phenomenon of immigration governance that is virtually immune
231
from judicial policing under existing separation of powers doctrine.
And, indeed, there may be much to fear from an overly meddlesome
232
court on this horizontal power-sharing issue. Thus, rather than insist
upon direct separation of powers judicial review, we might seek
refuge in an anti-preemption presumption, which operates vertically
to help maintain a check on federal overreaching. A presumption in
favor of preemption, by contrast, makes preemption of subfederal law
too easy. Given the judicial concessions already made on separation
of powers issues (most notably, the nondelegation doctrine) and on
federalism (most notably, the demise of dual federalism and the
enumerated powers doctrine), it seems dangerous to invite further

227. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) [hereinafter Hills, Against Preemption].
228. William Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441,
1470–71 (2008).
229. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism, supra note 135, at 1848–50.
230. See supra notes 99−118 and accompanying text (discussing immigration separation of
powers as between Congress and the Executive).
231. Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 538 (“[D]isciplining prosecutorial discretion
through the courts is extremely difficult. Add to this general difficulty the plenary power
tradition and courts’ general reluctance to step into anything connected to foreign affairs, and
this sort of correction seems even less likely.”); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) (rejecting a claim of selective immigration prosecution and
noting the particular difficulties with “invad[ing] a special province of the Executive” over its
prosecutorial discretion).
232. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 420 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (explaining how the courts are illequipped to discern inappropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion).
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recessions for preemption, which may be federalism’s most promising
salvage.
Outwardly, at least, the Court has rejected the bait for a
presumption in favor of immigration preemption. In Arizona, for
example, the Court affirmatively noted that it would not assume that
“‘the historic police powers of the States’ [were] superseded ‘unless
233
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Of course,
the doctrinal dissonance surrounding the anti-preemption
presumption is well-recognized: When it comes to applying the canon,
what the Court says is not necessarily (or even usually) what the
234
Court does. Even if that is the case, there remains some conceptual
distance to travel between an underenforced presumption against
preemption, on the one hand, and a presumption in favor of
preemption, on the other. The anti-preemption presumption, although
underenforced, offers some conceptual drag, and acts as a reminder
that Congress is the primary institution for making preemption
decisions.
b. Executive Immigration “Law”?
The shadowing effect of federal exclusivity also leads to
fundamental misconceptions about the Executive’s authority to
preempt state law. Two related ideas feed the confusion. The first idea
conceives of federal enforcement discretion as the yin to the
legislative yang—together inextricably forming our operational
“immigration law.” Under this view, “the discretion inherent in the
federal immigration scheme . . . is as much a part of the law of
235
immigration as the relevant statutory text.” This idea was reflected

233. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also DeCanas v. Bica 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)
(requiring a showing that Congress had a “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt state
regulation). In Whiting, the Court did not expressly mention the presumption against
preemption, but concluded that petitioners had not met their burden of meeting the “high
threshold” necessary for implied conflict preemption. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011).
234. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 (1991) (describing the Court’s approach to the presumption as “fickle”);
Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 69, at 741 (remarking that “the presumption against preemption
is honored as much in the breach as in observance”). Indeed, in Arizona, Justice Alito criticized
the majority’s failure to give expression to the anti-preemption presumption in its treatment of
Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2530 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
235. Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 260; see also Fan, supra note 134, at 1272 (“Executive
enforcement policy play[s] a crucial role in shaping the law in reality.”); Motomura, Immigration
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in Arizona, where the Court noted that a “principal feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
236
officials.” The second idea stresses federal exclusivity over foreign
affairs, in which the Executive’s enforcement decisions are thought to
237
play an essential part. This idea also found expression in Arizona,
where the Court noted that the “dynamic nature of relations with
other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign
238
policy.”
Although these expressions harbor elements of truth, neither
supports an executive power to preempt subfederal law.
Understanding why requires appreciation for the critical distinctions
drawn in the Supremacy Clause. Apart from the Constitution itself,
only “Laws” made pursuant thereof and “Treaties” can preempt state
239
law.
Nonbinding executive enforcement policies do not neatly qualify
as “Laws,” much less are they made “in pursuance of” the
Constitution. That the phrase “Laws . . . made in pursuance [of the
Constitution]” was intended to refer to statutes seems abundantly
clear not only from the context in which the phrase appears, but also
from its drafting history. Before being revised by the Committee of
Detail, the phrase in question read: “The Acts of the Legislature of the
United States made in pursuance of this Constitution . . . shall be the
240
Supreme law of the several States.” Absent any indication to the
contrary, there is no reason to believe that the change from “Acts of

Outside the Law, supra note 5, at 2064 (“[D]iscretion seems unusually important in immigration
law, because unlawful immigrant activity enjoys acceptance in many circles, and because rates of
investigation, detection, apprehension, and prosecution are extremely low.”).
236. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
237. See Fan, supra note 134, at 1272 (“Executive discretion balances sensitive foreign
affairs considerations that the constitutional structure entrusts to the national executive.”); see
also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (explaining that the federal government has
exclusive power over foreign affairs); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319–21 (1936) (discussing the President’s role in foreign affairs); Pham, supra note 95, at 968
(“[T]he immigration power must be exercised uniformly because of the need for the nation to
speak with one voice on foreign policy matters.”); cf. Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1565 (“When
courts perceive the subnational effort as a regulation of foreign policy, the space for local
regulation narrows.”).
238. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
239. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
240. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 183 (Max Farrand ed., 2d. ed.
1937) (emphasis added).
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the Legislature” to “Laws” was anything other than stylistic.
To be sure, as both Peter Strauss and Thomas Merrill propose, we
might capitalize on the Committee’s drafting edit to accommodate
more liberal interpretations of what qualifies as “Laws . . . made in
242
pursuance [of the Constitution].” But, as even they concede, doing
243
so would have to be for functional reasons that in my estimation
(and maybe even theirs) are not justified for nonbinding executive
244
policies. It is a truism that the Framers did not foresee our modern
government, and for that reason we might rightly be skeptical of
committing ourselves to their original intent. Still, however, we should
resist a reductionist approach that would include all federal action
within the scope of the Supremacy Clause simply because the Court,
for functional reasons, has deemed it appropriate to include some
245
types of unconventional lawmaking within the Clause’s ambit.
Perhaps a stronger case for executive preemption could be made
if the enforcement policies at issue were more Law-like; that is, if they
246
were binding in the way that Laws are. In other contexts, the
Court—albeit without any real analysis—has recognized the
247
preemptive effect of agency regulations that have the “force of law.”

241. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1354–55.
242. Merrill, supra note 69, at 761−64 (favoring a functional interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause that would allow for administrative preemption under certain limited circumstances, that
would seem to exclude nonbinding executive action); Strauss, The Perils of Theory, supra note
69, at 1574 (“Whatever the drafters’ theoretical expectations may have been . . . the passage of
time has overcome them.”).
243. Merrill, supra note 69, at 762; Strauss, The Perils of Theory, supra note 69, at 1597–99.
244. I also do not think that administrative regulations should qualify for preemptive effect,
see Rubenstein, supra note 64, at 1190–91 (rejecting the view that Congress can delegate
supremacy as a matter of Constitutional Law and challenging the notion that administrative
supremacy is functionally necessary or desirable), but my focus here on nonbinding executive
policies is more narrow.
245. Cf. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2010–12 (2008)
(arguing in favor of the preemptive effect of binding administrative rules that have traversed the
notice-and-comment process and that are subject to careful judicial review); Merrill, supra note
69, at 761–64 (favoring a functional interpretation of the Supremacy Clause that would allow for
administrative preemption under certain limited circumstances, which would seem to exclude
nonbinding executive action).
246. Cf. Merrill, supra note 69, at 763 (“Laws,” as the term is used in the Supremacy Clause,
“must refer, at a minimum, to explicit or implicit rules that bind the future exercise[s] of
government authority.” (emphasis added)).
247. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (holding that the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation
preempted state tort action); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 65 (1988) (holding that the
FCC’s technical standards preempted any state standards); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) (“Thus, we conclude that the [Federal Home Loan Bank]
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The Executive’s enforcement priorities, however, do not fit even this
248
modified version of preemption. In fact, the Executive has ardently
249
disclaimed that its enforcement policies have binding effect. The
reason is plain: The administration does not wish to invite or entertain
legal challenges when it departs from its general priorities in
individual cases.
Of course, the administration’s position that subfederal
governments are legally bound, but that the federal government is not
cuts sharply against the grain of a nation built on law. Indeed, the
Supremacy Clause works to prevent this very asymmetry through the
structural paradox I introduced earlier: executive enforcement
250
policies cannot both be Laws and not be Laws at the same time. By
constitutional design, this protects states by affording them an
opportunity to shape or block any Laws through the legislative
process before they may become preemptively binding.
Emphatically, none of this is to deny the Executive authority to set
enforcement policies. The Executive may enforce or underenforce

Board’s due-on-sale regulation was meant to pre-empt conflicting state limitations . . . .”); see
also Merrill, supra note 69, at 764 (“[I]f Congress has delegated authority to an agency to act
with the force of law, and if the agency has exercised this delegated power by taking action
intended to have the force of law, then the agency edict can serve as a source of preemption.”).
But cf. Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 12, at 871–75 (challenging administrative
preemption on constitutional grounds); Rubenstein, supra note 64, at 1129–31 (same, and
offering a normative defense of a system without “delegated supremacy”).
248. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013 WL 2128315, at *7
(D. Az. May 16, 2013) (holding that DACA does not have the “force of law,” and thus cannot
have preemptive effect).
249. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al.,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf. The June 2011 memorandum of ICE Director John Morton, for example, contains
the following “Disclaimer”:
As there is no right to the favorable exercise of discretion by the agency, nothing in
this memorandum should be construed to prohibit the apprehension, detention, or
removal of any alien unlawfully in the United States or to limit the legal authority of
ICE or any of its personnel to enforce federal immigration law. Similarly, this
memorandum, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without
notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
administrative, civil, or criminal matter.
Id.; see also DACA Memo, supra note 14 (making a similar disclaimer); Arizona Dream Act,
2013 WL 2128315, at *7 (observing that the Department of Homeland Security’s disclaimer in
the DACA Memo undermined the plaintiffs’ claim that the Memo could have preemptive
effect).
250. See discussion supra note 36.
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congressional laws to whatever degree tolerated by the “Take Care”
Clause and the political process. In this limited sense, executive
enforcement policies may be understood to be immigration law
(lower case “l”). But, without having traversed the legislative (or even
the administrative rulemaking) process, in no proper sense may these
policies be understood to be “Laws” (capital “L”) “made in pursuance
[of the Constitution].”
Nor does the foregoing deny Congress’s authority to preempt the
field of immigration enforcement. The critical question, however, is
whether Congress has done so—and, relatedly, whether enough
circumstantial evidence exists to support such a sweeping conclusion
251
by the Judiciary. To be sure, Congress has delegated enforcement
and discretionary authority to the Department of Homeland Security
252
(DHS). But these conferrals say nothing about displacing the state
253
police power. Indeed, Congress’s delegation of enforcement roles to
both public and private non-federal actors belies the notion that
Congress intends immigration enforcement to be exclusively
254
federal.
Moreover, simply because Congress underfunds
251. Cf. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal
regulation of a particular field “should not be presumed to preempt state enforcement activity
‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained’” (quoting
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976))); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of
Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 748–52 (2011) (addressing the potential federalism values
served by subfederal enforcement of federal law).
252. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (West 2013).
253. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken different positions on whether states have
inherent authority over immigration enforcement. For a time, DOJ maintained that local police
may arrest for criminal immigration violations but not civil immigration violations. See
Memorandum Op. from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice for the U.S. Att’y, S. Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopo1a.htm. But in a 2002 memorandum from the Office of
Legal Counsel, it found that local police officers have “inherent authority” to arrest for both
civil and criminal immigration violations. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Regarding NonPreemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for
Immigration Violations 1−4, 13 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
ACF27DA.pdf. For one critique of the 2002 opinion, which has not been superseded, see
generally Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095 (2004) (“The Attorney General’s conclusion makes little sense, and
contradicts not only well-settled canons of statutory interpretation, but also the specific
legislative history of these provisions.”).
254. See Cox & Posner, supra note 9, at 1287–88 (discussing the role of employers, families,
and state agents in monitoring and enforcing immigration law); see also MICHAEL JOHN
GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41423, AUTHORITY OF STATE
AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 3–9 (2012) (canvassing
Congress’s statutory delegations of enforcement authority to state and local police). But cf.
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255

enforcement of the immigration law does not mean that Congress
intends federal enforcement to be exclusive of the states. The opposite
inference might just as easily be drawn—i.e., that Congress hopes and
expects subfederal governments to play a gap-filling role. Similarly, to
the extent that Congress instructs the Executive to prioritize how
256
federal appropriations are spent, this does not itself suggest—much
less require—federal enforcement exclusivity. To be clear, Congress
might intend exclusive federal enforcement. But, to safeguard
federalism, care is needed before rushing to the conclusion that
257
Congress so intends. And for now, at least, the Court does not seem
to believe that Congress intended to preempt the field of immigration
258
enforcement.
The Executive’s role in foreign affairs complicates the analysis but
does not change the result. As noted above, the Executive has an
undeniable yet somewhat ambiguous constitutional role in foreign
259
affairs. The fundamental question, however, is not what power the
Executive has to speak for the country. Rather, the question is which
260
executive expressions of foreign policy can preempt state law.
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 361–62 (explaining that a federal statute that recognized some role for
states in employment relationships involving undocumented immigrants was evidence that
Congress did not intend to occupy the field of immigration employment).
255. “Underfunded” in the sense that the appropriations come nowhere near what it would
take to fully enforce the law. This is not to deny the incredible sums of money that have been
appropriated for enforcement. See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2–3 (2013), available at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf (providing funding statistics). That these
funds fall woefully short, however, only highlights the enormity of what full-enforcement would
entail.
256. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II,
125 Stat. 786 (directing DHS to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of
a crime by the severity of that crime”); accord Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, tit. II, 123 Stat. 2142.
257. Cf. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal
regulation of a particular field “should not be presumed to preempt state enforcement activity
“‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained’” (quoting
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356).
258. If the Court believed that Congress intended to oust subfederal enforcement through
field preemption, there would have been no need for the Court to consider in Arizona whether
state arrest measures undermined or conflicted with federal enforcement priorities.
259. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (explaining executive control over
immigration stems from its constitutionally enumerated power over foreign affairs).
260. Cf. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, supra note 69, at 1660 (“[A]s a
practical matter, the President may make sole executive agreements . . . . The Constitution,
however, does not require courts to recognize such agreements as ‘the supreme Law of the
Land.”); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 829 (“It is, of course, uncontroversial that
ordinarily state laws and policies must give way to the foreign affairs objectives of the national
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The negative inference from the Supremacy Clause is that
“Treaties” are the only foreign commitments that can preempt state
261
law. And, as Professor Clark has highlighted, the context and
drafting history of the Supremacy Clause strongly supports that
262
interpretation.
Still, the Court’s precedent has been more
generous—at least when the President is involved. More specifically,
the Court has held that formalized executive agreements with foreign
263
nations can preempt state law under certain limited circumstances.
Of course, however, DHS enforcement policies—even if blessed by
the President—are of a very different ilk. To begin with, DHS policies
are not ordained with a stamp of national commitment to foreign
countries. Moreover, whereas executive agreements necessarily
implicate foreign affairs, immigration enforcement policies only
sometimes will, leaving difficult evidentiary questions about what will
prove a sufficient conflict with foreign policy and how deeply a court
should probe to discover it. Thus, as Patrick Charles argues, “[a]bsent
a treaty or international agreement stating express foreign policy
objectives, executive policy preferences alone are insufficient to
264
preempt state and local immigration laws.”
Quite apart from the foregoing, the mantra that the country speak
with “one voice” in foreign affairs obscures that the federal political
branches are already speaking with two voices: that of Congress and
265
the Executive. Although an undifferentiated federal government
government. . . . The critical question, though, is how these overriding federal goals are
developed and identified.”).
261. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 907 (“By setting forth specific allocations of
preemptive power, the Constitution contains a strong negative implication that it does not
contain additional allocations of preemptive power sub silentio.”); see also id. at 843 (“The
inclusion of treaties . . . in the Supremacy Clause shows the extent to which the Constitution’s
framers focused upon state interference in foreign affairs under the Articles [of
Confederation].”).
262. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1337–39 (noting that the negative
implication of the Supremacy Clause is that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the
exclusive grounds for displacing state law).
263. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“Generally, then, valid
executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are . . . .”).
264. Patrick J. Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption in Arizona v. United States:
Federal Plenary Power, the Spheres of Government, and the Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 157 (2012).
265. See Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, supra note
130, at 985 (noting that “[i]t is clear that the Framers guaranteed, as a matter of constitutional
design, that the United States would not ‘speak with one voice’ in foreign relations,” given the
Constitution’s division of the foreign affairs power among the three federal branches); accord
Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 41
(2005).
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clearly trumps the states in foreign affairs, as between the federal
political branches, Congress generally trumps the President (and
266
certainly trumps DHS). Thus, subfederal laws that send a strong
message of unwelcome to unlawfully present immigrants will at least
be consistent with Congress’s foreign affairs position with respect to
this class of aliens (provided, of course, that such subfederal laws do
267
not otherwise violate protected civil liberties). As Professor Spiro
suggests, “state measures against undocumented aliens would almost
by definition seem not only consistent with ultimate federal control of
immigration . . . but also in furtherance of its execution to the extent
268
that such measures may encourage unlawful aliens to repatriate.”
Again, this is not to deny federal eminence over the states in foreign
affairs. Rather, my point is only to distinguish the character of
nonbinding enforcement policies from other, more formalized, federal
instruments (such as statutes, administrative regulations, treaties, and
certain executive agreements).
Endorsing the preemptive effect of unilateral executive action
would cripple the political and procedural safeguards of federalism
because states would lose their best (and perhaps only) opportunity
269
to block preemptive laws. Of course, Congress may be able to
override unilateral executive policies ex post. This ordering, however,
significantly transfers the political burden. Given the many
“vetogates” in the legislative process, it takes considerably more votes
270
to pass a law than to block one. The inertial resistance of the federal
legislative process, however, was structurally intended to inure to the
271
states, not the Executive.
266. Charles, supra note 264, at 157 (“[I]t is Congress’s purposes and objectives that are the
benchmark from which courts must adjudicate foreign affairs preemption.”); see also Cox &
Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 475; Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 57)
(“Although immigration straddles domestic and foreign policy, Congress, not the President, has
the controlling authority in that area.”).
267. Cf. Brief for Michigan, supra note 154, at 8 (“[A] State enforcing Congress’s intent too
well cannot violate Congress’s intent.”).
268. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 148.
269. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 925 (making the same claim in the context of
foreign affairs preemption).
270. See generally Eskridge, supra note 228, at 1444–48. Each of the vetogates present an
opportunity for opponents of the measure to kill (or maim) a bill. Id. For general discussions on
vetogates, see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 528–33 (1992); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 716–27 (1992).
271. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 905 (arguing that permitting executive
preemption in foreign affairs shifts “the burden of overcoming legislative inertia . . . from the
President to the claimants”). For a general discussion on the erosion of the enumerated powers
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* * *
In sum, those that press for exceptionalism in immigration
federalism explicitly or tacitly treat potential breakdowns along the
separation of powers dimension as a basis for further concessions
along the federalism dimension. They tend to highlight Congress’s
plenary power over immigration, vast conferrals of policymaking
power to the Executive, and inherent executive power to make
272
immigration “Law.” The theory of immigration structuralism that I
advance here takes a fundamentally different tack. Among other
things, it treats possible failings along the separation of powers
dimension as a reason for insisting upon preemption doctrine’s
conventional application. That means rejecting a presumption in favor
of preemption and foreclosing the preemptive effect of nonbinding
executive enforcement policies. These limitations safeguard
federalism by channeling preemption decisions to Congress, and,
concomitantly, away from the Executive and courts.
B. Safeguarding Separation of Powers
Apart from safeguarding federalism, the normalization of
immigration preemption doctrine may also indirectly safeguard
separation of powers in four critical respects. First, limiting the class of
preemptive federal laws to those expressly contemplated in the
Supremacy Clause puts pressure on the federal political branches to
adhere to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures—at least
when the political branches intend such policies to have preemptive
273
effect. In a system where executive policies can trump state law,
Congress has far more political incentive to delegate than to decide;
meanwhile, the Executive has far more political incentive to decide

doctrine and its implications for preemption doctrine, see, for example, Young, The Ordinary
Diet, supra note 173, at 306 (“[T]he enumerated limits on Congress’s powers now play an
extremely limited role in preserving the federal balance, and preemption has become the central
question of our federalism.”).
272. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 134, at 1273, 1275, 1296–98 (arguing that the “plenary power
doctrine, though oft critiqued as protection stripping and a basis for judicial nonintervention,
can inform in our contemporary context judicial intervention against overreaching state laws”
and “protect[] against the new strategy of dissentient state laws encroaching on executive
enforcement policy”).
273. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 829 (“Giving mere Executive policy
preemptive effect . . . bypasses these constitutional processes and concentrates power in the
executive branch.”); see also id. (“[R]ejecting executive preemption enhances checks and
balances in foreign affairs; accepting it reduces them.”).
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274

for itself than to seek congressional approval.
Either way,
immigration power is accumulated in the Executive. That is certainly
275
problematic if Congress did not intend it. If, on the other hand,
Congress intends wink-and-nod lawmaking through de facto
delegation, then judicial foreclosure of executive preemption could
help curb that pathology.
Second, applying the Supremacy Clause in a way that
discriminates between legislative and executive action preserves
276
certain subfederal policies that could otherwise be preempted. The
resulting regulatory overlap can generate political discourse that
sheds light on the federal policy, can spur Congress to take a harder
look at the issues, and can even provide Congress political grist to
277
decide those issues.
Indeed, if nothing else, the subfederal
restrictionist movement has successfully galvanized a national debate
278
on the desirability of greater or lesser immigration enforcement.
Third, the friction generated by federal-state overlap sheds light
279
on which federal institution has ownership of the policies at issue.
This becomes particularly salient in contexts like those at issue here,
where the law on the books may not reflect its operational expression.
In a system where executive enforcement policies can trump state law,
it would not matter whether executive policies are consistent with or
antithetical to congressional design. Removing the outlet of executive
preemption, however, puts political pressure on the Executive to
achieve its desired ends through the legislative process. Short of that,
the Executive would have to come clean in its inability or
274. Cf. id. at 902 (“[T]o the extent executive preemption is accepted as a constitutional
power, it broadens the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs without a congressional
check.”).
275. In similar regard, John Yoo and Robert Delahunty note that “the threat of nonenforcement gives the President improper leverage over Congress by providing a second, postenactment veto.” Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 9).
276. For example, absent the administration’s enforcement priorities, it is possible that
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 Section 3 (involving registration violations) and Section 6 (involving
warrantless arrests) would not have been preempted. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying
text. In any event, the absence of executive preemption could only lead to equal or more
federal-state regulatory overlap.
277. Cf. Gerken & Bulman-Pozen, supra note 80, at 1305 (“A more limited preemption
doctrine . . . would require Congress to engage more directly with state policies it wished to
override.”); Hills, Against Preemption, supra note 227, at 9–10 (2007) (“State lawmaking can
give Congress the right incentives to focus on the most important ambiguities in federal law.”).
278. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (2010)
(making the point that S.B. 1070 forced national elites to engage the issue of immigration).
279. Cf. Gerken & Bulman-Pozen, supra note 80, at 1289 (noting that accountability is a
benefit that is derived from the overlap of federal-state regulation).
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unwillingness to obtain congressional support. Insofar as subfederal
governments are relying on Congress’s law, the Executive must
effectively shrug off Congress when it shrugs off subfederal
280
resistance. A doctrine that forecloses the preemptive effect of
nonbinding executive policies exposes the gulf between what the law
281
says and does, and thus may spur Congress or the courts into action.
Fourth, as earlier explained, the line between permissible law
execution and impermissible lawmaking is obscured, in part, by the
question of whether the Executive’s policy owes to resource
constraints or political preference. Foreclosing executive preemption
may help to bring more transparency to the Executive’s actions. If
executive underenforcement is born of resource constraints (and thus
justified against separation of powers challenges), it becomes more
difficult for the administration to credibly argue that subfederal
enforcement initiatives preemptively conflict with federal law: The
multiplier of subfederal enforcement generally should not pose an
282
obstacle (and thus should not be preempted). Meanwhile, if the
administration insists that subfederal initiatives conflict with
executive priorities (thus raising the specter of a preemptive conflict),
courts may begin to appreciate those executive priorities as a type of
affirmative policy encroaching on the legislative function (thus
exposing a potential separation of powers problem).
These points come to life in the legal and political discourse
surrounding the Executive’s DACA program. As discussed earlier,
DACA permits certain qualifying undocumented immigrants to
remain and work in the United States for renewable two-year
283
periods. Arizona and other states have adopted policies of denying
284
The American Civil
drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries.
280. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 12, at 483, 486, 489 (making a similar point for
cooperative federalism schemes).
281. Cf. id.
282. Of course, if subfederal enforcement initiatives burden executive resources in ways not
intended by Congress, then a preemptive conflict might exist. The party claiming preemption,
however, should bear the burden of demonstrating that. For the interesting view that subfederal
enforcement measures may be unconstitutional as a type of “reverse-commandeering,” see
generally Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535 (2012). But even
assuming that the Constitution protects the federal government against commandeering, cf.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that states are protected against
federal commandeering), substantiating such a claim would still require showing that subfederal
measures have commandeering effect.
283. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (allowing for discretion in prosecuting
illegal immigrants that came to the United States as children).
284. See supra note 27.
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Liberties Union and others have recently filed suits to enjoin this
subfederal resistance, raising the questions of whether DACA could
285
or should have preemptive effect. For reasons earlier explained, I do
not think DACA can preempt. Nor do I think it should.
It will be useful here to compare and contrast how a “yes” or “no”
answer to the preemption question might change the political
dynamics. To begin with, a “yes” answer significantly alleviates the
Executive’s incentive to obtain congressional support for the DACA
program. Indeed, past efforts to obtain congressional support have
286
repeatedly failed, leaving us to wonder whether members of
Congress intended, or simply hoped, to pass the buck. This shines light
on a related concern with a “yes” answer: Congress has less incentive
to enact such legislation if it knows or expects the Executive to
accomplish similar ends. This is not the way federal Law is supposed
287
to be made. Nor is it the best way. Indeed, as generous as the DACA
program is, immigrant advocates have expressed a strong preference
for a legislative solution on account of the assurance and stability it
288
would bring relative to the administration’s nonbinding program.
By contrast, a “no” answer to whether DACA can preempt leaves
room for subfederal governments to dissent—such as by denying
drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries. This still permits the
Executive to promote the DACA policy, but only as a national
default, subject to jurisdictional resistance. The existence of
competing policies shines greater political light on the fact that
DACA is an executive (rather than congressional) policy, because as a
statutory program it would clearly have preemptive effect. Once
attributed to the Executive, questions naturally arise over whether the

285. See supra note 28. Recently, the United States District Court of Arizona held that
Arizona’s policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries was not preempted,
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013
WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2013).
286. See Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 16, at 18–19 (collecting cites
for two dozen bills in which the DREAM Act, in various forms, has been proposed).
287. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (declaring that Law shall be made through bicameral
congressional legislation and presented to the President).
288. See, e.g., Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19; Jens Erik Gould, Why Are
Some Undocumenteds Nervous About Obama’s Immigration Reform?, TIME (Aug. 13, 2012),
http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/why-are-some-undocumenteds-nervous-about-obamas-immig
ration-reform/#ixzz2CJ0Sg8lf; Tamar Jacoby, Obama’s Executive Order Is Good News, But Not
the Solution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT DEBATE CLUB (June 19, 2012),
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-obama-right-to-grant-young-illegal-immigrants-work-pe
rmits/obamas-executive-order-is-political-theater; Michael Olivas, Why “Deferred Action” Isn’t
Enough, FROM THE SQUARE (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.fromthesquare.org/?p=3829.
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initiative is born of resource constraint, preferential policy, or both.
This, in turn, can force transparency, which conceivably could aid a
court in determining whether the Executive is “tak[ing] Care that the
289
Laws be faithfully executed.” Even short of a judicial check,
however, pressuring the Executive to explain whether the program is
born of resource constraints or political preference helps point to
290
where political accountability rests.
* * *
The foregoing Part advanced a theory of immigration
structuralism. Its underlying premise is that we should consult both
federalism and separation of powers norms in addressing questions of
relative power in the current immigration debate. The
interdimensional relationship between separation of powers and
federalism generates possibilities for harnessing that relationship in
structurally and politically reinforcing ways. The normalization of
immigration preemption doctrine seeks to do just that, offering
safeguards for both federalism and separation of powers.
IV. FORM AND SUBSTANCE
This concluding Part responds to perhaps the most trenchant
objection to my proposal: that it improvidently values form over
substance. To curb expectations, those of the view that structural
norms are irrelevant or wholly expendable may safely stop reading.
Nothing I offer below is intended or likely to convince otherwise.
Surely, my own view is that structure matters—not only because of
the liberty-enhancing values it promotes, but also, more
291
fundamentally, because our Constitution demands it.
Though
federalism may not yield optimal outcomes in all cases, it remains
292
central to our governmental order. To insist on these points at any
289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
290. President Obama publically took the position that the policy is due to resource
constraints. See Barack Obama, Exclusive: A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME
(June 17, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/.
291. See, e.g., Young, Making Federalism, supra note 135, at 1762−64 (“Even if one were
convinced that all the functional arguments for federalism . . . were spurious, it would not be
open to us to reject federalism and create a unitary system.”). But see generally Edwin Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903−52
(1994) (offering a classic view to the contrary, and arguing that the current dominant
interpretation of federalism is grounded in improper functional valuations).
292. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“Our task would be the same
even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of
devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework
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greater length here, however, is beyond the scope of this Article’s
ambition. Rather, my only hope for this Part is to explain why
elevating substance over form—while principled—may be a
dangerous long-term strategy for the very advocates of that ordering.
A. Valuing Immigration Federalism
The exclusivity principle would be more attractive if there were
simply no value in leaving subfederal space to operate. But there is
potential value, even if we think that many of the subfederal measures
on the table are politically misguided or morally reproachable.
First, immigration federalism offers a means toward satisfying
more citizen preferences than federal exclusivity necessarily would.
Professor Rodriguez explains, for example, that because “the effects
of immigration are felt differently in different parts of the country,”
subfederal “participation in integration matters can promote
293
efficiency” and optimize localized political preferences. In this
regard, Professor Rodriguez highlights the “primary function states
and localities play” in integrating both legal and illegal immigrants
294
into the body politic. This integrative function is born of territorial
necessity; but, as such, it is also a function over which subfederal
295
governments have developed experience and expertise. Preferences
can thus be locally tailored and attuned in ways that centralized
296
decisionmaking generally cannot.
Recent history evidences both a need and a desire for this
flexibility. Though some subfederal governments enact restrictionist
measures, others enact protectionist measures that federal law does
not require (and in some cases may not even allow). For example,
some subfederal governments provide welfare benefits that federal

set forth in the Constitution.”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency
Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 225 (2009) (“The
Constitution preserves state authority even when it is inefficient . . . .”).
293. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 608−09; see also Huntington,
supra note 139, at 831 (“Decentralizing and devolving decisionmaking regarding non-citizens
may accommodate, and reflect a great variety of views on, non-citizens . . . .”); Rick Su, A
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N. CAR. L. REV. 1619, 1632−54 (2008)
(highlighting the important potential for localism in immigration regulation).
294. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 571 (demonstrating how
states integrate immigrants in order to establish the proposition that immigration regulation
should be included in the list of quintessentially state interests).
295. Id. at 582.
296. See id. at 582−90 (providing examples of how different states create different solutions
to best solve localized immigration issues).
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law does not require, allow day-labor centers for unauthorized
workers, offer in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants, grant them
drivers licenses, and resist cooperating with federal immigration
297
enforcement. Federal exclusivity would eliminate these localized
preferences. Indeed, as Professors Young and Baker note, subfederal
laws that violate no federal or state constitution but that “nonetheless
express a moral preference that some find reprehensible” tend to
denote areas of moral disagreement and thus are “precisely the areas
298
in which interstate diversity is most valuable.”
Second, preserving a subfederal role promotes regulatory
299
experimentation. For example, as Professor Huntington explains,
some restrictionist localities might invest in new means and resources
300
The national and other
for identifying unlawful immigrants.
subfederal governments might be informed about the utility of others’
301
experiments, without having to make investments themselves. If
subfederal enforcement results in other problems, “such as racial
profiling, decreased reporting of crimes by non-citizens, and fewer
arrests for other crimes, the national government might reconsider its
enlistment of state and local officers and decide to preempt the
302
conduct.” At the same time, subfederal protectionist initiatives that
might otherwise be preempted by a centralized and uniform law also
303
afford experimental opportunities.

297. Id. (discussing subfederal integrative schemes). For a discussion of the permissibility of
subfederal “sanctuary” programs, see generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison
Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1683 (2009).
298. Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 155−56.
299. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 847 (discussing the experimental value of restrictive
subnational laws); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070−71 (2007) (explaining that “local government experimentation in
the immigration realm can lead to successes or failures that can inform federal policy-making”).
But cf. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1673−77 (challenging the assertion that states
can serve as valuable laboratories of immigration reform).
300. Huntington, supra note 139, at 843.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 580 (noting that
subfederal protectionist measures are “vulnerable in the face of a strong theory of
preemption”); see also Howard Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 363−64 (2002) (observing that
“we might just as plausibly view federal authorization of divergent state policies as creating
laboratories of generosity toward immigrants”).
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Third—and perhaps most importantly—our federalist system was
intended to preserve a role for the states as a check against federal
304
policies. As noted earlier, subfederal governments have important
economic and social stakes in unlawful immigration. To the extent
that the national policy does not address these concerns, leaving a role
305
for subfederal governments is critical. Through dissenting action,
subfederal governments can summon the federal government to
306
respond in ways that verbal criticism alone cannot. In this regard,
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken explain: “[I]t is desirable
to have some level of friction, some amount of state contestation,
307
some deliberation-generating froth in our democratic system.” In
like regard, Robert Schapiro explains that “[a] state law can provide
an important protest—a powerful criticism of the federal approach”
308
that may in time help to produce a change in federal policy.
This holds equally true for both restrictionist and protectionist
subfederal measures. As relates to federal underenforcement in
particular, states can provide a check on executive policy—and
simultaneously protect their own interests—through increased
309
enforcement efforts. Even if such checks do not occasion change at
the federal level, at least states will not be powerless to protect
themselves against the unevenly distributed costs of unlawful
immigration. As Margaret Lemos observes (speaking outside the
immigration context but in terms fully apt here), a subfederal

304. See infra text accompanying notes 320−32 (describing how immigration federalism can
act as a check against federal overreach); see also Huntington, supra note 139, at 836−37
(“Sharing immigration authority means that states and localities also will be able to counteract
federal immigration regulation.”).
305. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 833 (arguing that national immigration policy fails to
adequately address state-specific economic and social concerns).
306. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 80, at 1284−85 (noting surprising neglect in
federalism literature of how states implementing federal mandates can be a dissenter, rival, and
challenger); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749, 1783
(2005) (noting that “federalism can be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing
would-be dissenters to govern in some subpart of a system,” which in turn contributes to the
marketplace of ideas, and facilitates self-government and self-expression).
307. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 80, at 1284.
308. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
289 (2005).
309. See Lemos, supra note 251, at 748 (“Enforcement authority creates a state-level check
against underenforcement by federal agencies.”); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism
Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case
Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
165, 176−77 (2010) (explaining that enforcement authority enables states to step in when federal
agencies fail to enforce).
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enforcement role “offers a hedge against the possibility that the
federal government will occupy the field . . . and then abdicate on
310
enforcement.” Indeed, federal abdication is precisely what many
subfederal jurisdictions are complaining about. At the same time,
preserving subfederal autonomy offers a vital check against what may
be ill-advised federal enforcement policies. The recent surge of
subfederal resistance to President Obama’s Secure Communities
311
program is a testament to this. Under the Secure Communities
program, DHS receives fingerprint data for persons arrested by local
312
law enforcement. If the arrestee is found to be unlawfully present,
DHS issues a “detainer” requesting that local enforcement hold the
arrestee for up to forty-eight hours while DHS arranges to transfer
313
the individual into federal custody. Though many subfederal
jurisdictions have embraced Secure Communities, a growing number
have expressed disapproval, with some actively (and openly) refusing
314
to comply. These complaining jurisdictions have argued that the
federal program may upset civil rights and undermine community
315
building efforts of local law enforcement. Rendering subfederal
governments impotent would sideline local preferences and vitiate a
dialogue-generating counterbalance to federal enforcement policy.
Providing space for dissenting action—whether protectionist or

310. Lemos, supra note 251, at 764; see also Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, supra note 308, at 290 (noting that “redundancy constitutes a fail-safe mechanism—
an additional source of protection if one or the other government should fail to offer adequate
safeguards” arising from a failure either to address an issue or to enforce applicable
regulations).
311. The list of non-complying jurisdictions includes, but is not limited to, Connecticut, see
Mary E. O’Leary, Connecticut First State to Set Rules for Holding Undocumented Immigrants for
(Mar.
27,
2012),
http://nhregister.com/articles/
ICE,
NEW HAVEN REGISTER
2012/03/27/news/doc4f727619070ce218682048.txt; Milwaukee, see Milwaukee, Wis., County Bd.
Res. 12-135 (June 4, 2012); the District of Columbia, see D.C. Council, The Immigration
Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2011 (June 5, 2012); Santa Clara, see Santa Clara,
Calif., Board of Supervisors’ Policy Manual Sec. 3.54, Civil Immigration Retainer Requests
(Oct. 18, 2011); San Francisco, see San Francisco, Calif., Board of Supervisors Resolution 53511, Supporting Policy Restricting Use of Local Funds to Respond to Civil Immigration
Detainers (Dec. 23, 2011); and Cook County (Chicago), see Cook County, Ill., County
Commission Ordinance 11-0-73, Fair and Equal County for Immigrants Ordinance (Sept. 7,
2011); see also Lornet Turnbull, 3 King County Officials Balk at ICE Detainer Program,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2012; Mihir Zaveri, In D.C., No Warm Welcome for Immigration
Crackdown, WASH. POST, June 6, 2012.
312. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC. 4 (2011).
313. Id. at 26−27.
314. See supra note 311 (collecting examples).
315. See Turnbull, supra note 311; Zaveri, supra note 311.
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restrictionist—can thus be a virtue.
None of this is to insist that the values of decentralization will be
met with every subfederal law. Sometimes the costs of
decentralization will be outweighed by the values of centralization.
For example, uniformity may counteract race-to-the-bottom and
316
externality pathologies that decentralization may produce. Beyond
these concerns, decentralization may upset the foreign affairs
principle that we speak as a nation with “one voice” on matters
317
involving immigration. Finally, there is concern that violations of
individual rights are more likely to occur when subfederal
318
governments play a role in enforcement.
These are real concerns, indeed. But Congress—not the courts,
and not the Executive—should be making decisions about when the
values of centralization outweigh the potential values of
decentralization. Congress is the institutional body best positioned to
make those decisions, and the Supremacy Clause also seems to
319
require it. To the extent that there is something special about
immigration, Congress can and should take action to give it special
treatment. Our concern should be aroused, however, when the courts
elevate either their own or the Executive’s will over that of Congress.
316. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1725 (discussing these pathologies
as related to subfederal restrictionist laws); see also Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 125−26
(noting that the “need to overcome externalities and other collective action problems . . . is one
of the classic justifications for federal action”). Of course, whether subfederal initiatives to
enforce the immigration laws signify a race to the bottom (or top) probably depends on one’s
perspective.
317. See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of
McCulloch, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 191, 204 (2012); Michael Olivas, ImmigrationRelated State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 35, 53; Pham, supra note 95, at 991, 1001; Spiro, DemiSovereignties, supra note 174, at 156 (summarizing foreign affairs arguments for unitary federal
control); see also United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352−53 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining
preliminarily portions of S.B. 1070 on the ground that it would “have a deleterious effect on the
United States’ foreign relations” to the point that it creates “actual foreign policy problems of a
magnitude far greater than incidental”); id. at 366−39 (Noonan, J., concurring) (focusing on
foreign affairs reasons to preliminarily enjoin sections of S.B. 1070).
318. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 95, at 997 (“The possibility of rogue enforcement of
immigration laws, where officers employ racial profiling and other prohibited practices, is much
more likely to occur at the local levels, compounding the uniformity problem.”); see also Orde
Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1449, 1477 (2006) (explaining why police may be hesitant to be involved in immigration law
enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism, 58 NYU ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 283, 291 (2002) (describing various tensions that may arise between local law
enforcement and federal immigration agencies).
319. See supra Part III (explaining why Congress both should and must have the final say on
matters of immigration Law).

RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM

10/21/2013 10:40 PM

145

B. The Dangers of Selective Exceptionalism
Still, given the immediacy of the problem at hand, most immigrant
advocates may understandably prefer to take their chances with a
doctrine that promotes across-the-board federal uniformity, even (or
especially) in the face of congressional silence or ambiguity. The
exigencies of the subfederal immigration revolution, they may argue,
can neither await nor be made to depend upon a legislative response.
To be sure, this view of immigration federalism is entirely principled:
it understands the restrictionist measures as wrongheaded—either
because they are ineffectual or harmful—and seeks to liberalize
structural norms to accommodate desired ends. But that approach
leaves much cause for concern.
First, claims for an expansive preemption doctrine in immigration
rely heavily on the same foreign affairs rationale excoriated by
generations of immigrant advocates in their assault on the plenary
320
doctrine. Though that assault is mostly directed at promoting limits
321
on federal action through the Bill of Rights, the very same concerns
resonate for structuralism—inasmuch as it too is directed at securing
322
liberty. Even in the subconstitutional context of administrative law,
the nexus between immigration and foreign affairs has been
scrupulously parsed to prevent immigration agencies from too easily
taking advantage of the notice-and-comment rulemaking exception
323
for foreign affairs. To selectively rely on foreign affairs as a reason

320. See supra notes 86−97 and accompanying text (explaining the plenary doctrine and
noting that the foreign affairs rationale has historically been used to uphold federal action
against immigrant interests). See also Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 155,
261−65 (questioning the foreign affairs rationale for the plenary doctrine, and noting that
“commentators . . . are in broad agreement that not all matters affecting foreign policy are
beyond judicial cognizance”); Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 183, at 1898 (“[T]he
correlation between the substance of immigration policy and the [foreign relations] factors that
have been invoked to justify extreme judicial deference is very weak.”). But cf. Legomsky,
Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 266−67 (suggesting that the foreign affairs rationale might
have a different application in federalism, as opposed to the separation of powers context).
321. See, e.g., Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 84, at passim (arguing that the
plenary doctrine allows racial discrimination in federal immigration laws).
322. See supra notes 57−60 and accompanying text (explaining how vertical separation of
powers was intended to provide a check against the federal government).
323. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Administrative
Procedure Act’s foreign affairs exception for notice-and-comment rulemaking did not apply due
to an insufficient link between the agency’s policy and foreign affairs); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d
1455, 1477–78 (11th Cir. 1983) (construing the foreign affairs exception very narrowly); see also
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 F.3d 172, 202 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting that “it would be problematic if incidental foreign affairs effects eliminated public
participation in this entire area of administrative law”).
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for federal exclusivity or for a special Executive role in preemption
undermines important progress made by immigration advocates in
other contexts.
Second, Professor Spiro’s “steam-valve” theory offers yet another
cautionary note. Using historical immigration examples, he explains
how allowing space for subfederal governments to act on antiimmigrant sentiments can diminish “interest on their part to seek
324
national legislation to similarly restrictionist ends.” By providing
room for subfederal governments to “let off their steam, however
325
scalding it may be, the nation need not visit the same sins.” At the
same time, subfederal variance “could also work to distribute the
costs of undocumented aliens more equitably among the states” and
326
“encourage migration to where their presence is more desired.”
Professor Spiro’s steam-valve theory takes on added significance
when considered in connection with the plenary doctrine. As
preemption doctrine expands to suppress subfederal interests, states
can be expected to push harder for a national solution that suits their
restrictionist agenda. And, if successful, those restrictionist policies
“will move from a context in which judicial discipline is extremely
327
stern to one in which it is most relaxed.” Without knowing what
Congress will decide if and when it tackles the issues, or what a future
administration might bring, it seems short-sighted for immigrant
advocates to invest in structural doctrines that instill an
undifferentiated federal monopoly. As Professor Huntington notes,
“there is no structural reason to believe that one level of government
will be more or less welcoming to non-citizens and therefore, on this
328
basis, to favor uniformity over experimentalism.”

324. Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 92, at 1627. These examples included congressional
restrictionist enactments in 1996, following the judicial defeat of California’s Proposition 187.
325. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 174. For critiques of Professor Spiro’s
steam-valve theory, see, for example, Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, A Reappraisal, supra note
170 (rejecting the premise of the steam-valve theory); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:
Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 1425, 1436–37 (1995); Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry, supra note 174, at 558
(“History simply does not support reliance on ‘steam valve federalism’ as a reason to celebrate
the claimed new state freedom to discriminate against immigrants.”).
326. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 173.
327. Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 92, at 1632.
328. Huntington, supra note 139, at 831 (“In a world where some states are offering in-state
tuition to unauthorized migrants while the federal government is seeking to construct a wall
along the southern border, it is by no means clear that the national government will better
protect the interests of non-citizens.”).
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Third, as several commentators have expressed, a principal
concern with the restrictionist movement is that it is racially
329
motivated. To the extent that concern is well founded, the equalprotection doctrine (not the preemption doctrine) would seem to be
330
the more appropriate fix. Whereas the federal government’s
alienage classifications are mostly immune from judicial review under
the plenary doctrine, the Court has declared subfederal
“classifications based on alienage” to be “inherently suspect to close
judicial scrutiny,” at least when the discrimination targets lawfully
331
present immigrants. As to lawfully present immigrants, then, the
Court can be expected to thwart unlawful discrimination without
332
having to distort preemption doctrine for that purpose.

329. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration
Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (June 18, 2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/discrimination-preemption (noting that the current
immigration debate is driven by discrimination); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 636 (2012)
(“Modern immigration clearly implicated issues of race.”); Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and
Otherwise, supra note 84, at 79 (arguing that immigrants are punished by voters as a
consequence of their race); Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6, at 1743 (“[T]he most
forceful and often repeated criticism of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement
is improper reliance on race and ethnicity. . . . [T]he concern is that not only unauthorized
migrants, but also lawfully present U.S. citizens and noncitizens, will suffer targeting and
discrimination by race and ethnicity.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Karla Mari
McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J.
ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 163 (2010) (“[S]tate and local anti-immigrant laws lead to
segregation, exclusion, and degradation of Latinos from American society in the same way that
Jim Crow laws excluded African Americans from membership in social, political, and economic
institutions within the United States and relegated them to second-class citizenship.”).
330. Indeed, several lawsuits challenge subfederal restrictionist policies on equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino
Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Complaint,
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Arizona, No. 10-1453 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2010);
Complaint, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010). And, the
Department of Justice, for its part, has recently filed suits alleging constitutional and civil rights
violations against officials in Arizona and North Carolina. See Complaint, United States v.
Maricopa Cnty., No. CV-12-00981-PHX-ROS, 2012 WL 1631747 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2012);
Complaint, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:12-cv-01349 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2012).
331. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (invalidating an Arizona law
that restricted legal aliens’ access to benefits), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding
that the federal government could deny benefits to classes of noncitizens even though states
could not). The “suspect class” designation has precluded most subfederal discrimination
against legal resident immigrants. Unlawfully present immigrants have not enjoyed the same
level of protection at the subfederal level, but are afforded at least as much (if not more) judicial
protection against subfederal discrimination than at the federal level. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 206−30 (1982) (holding that states cannot deny undocumented children equal access to
primary and secondary education).
332. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 371−72, 376 (finding alienage a suspect class, prompting
strict scrutiny of two states’ discriminatory laws concerning economic benefits for legal
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To be sure, protecting unlawful immigrants against subfederal
discrimination may be more difficult under the Equal Protection
Clause, as the Court has yet to recognize unlawful immigrants as a
333
protected class. Meanwhile, equal protection claims premised on
racial or ethnic discrimination may be too difficult to substantiate
334
given the jurisprudential hurdle of proving a discriminatory intent.
It is in this spirit that some commentators favor an approach to
preemption that will be more sensitive to, and perhaps compensate
335
for, equal protection concerns.
The allure of an equal protection approach to preemption is
twofold. First, the approach leverages the perception that subfederal
policymakers are discriminating, or at least are reasonably feared to
be discriminating. Second, for immigrant advocates, infusing the
preemption doctrine with equal protection norms is attractive
because it provides a basis for arguing that restrictionist measures
336
should be preempted even while protectionist measures are not.
However, an equal protection approach to preemption carries its
own problems, as some Justices made clear in Arizona. In a telling
exchange during the opening moments of oral argument, Chief Justice
Roberts interrupted Solicitor General Donald Verrilli to inquire:
“Before you get into what the case is about, I’d like to clear up at the
outset what it’s not about. No part of your argument has to do with
337
racial or ethnic profiling, does it?” The Solicitor General relented,
338
responding: “That’s correct.” And when the issue of race surfaced

permanent residents); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419−20 (1948)
(finding state regulation limiting commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship
to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (finding state
employment restrictions on immigrants to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369−74 (1886) (finding Equal Protection to apply to non-citizens because
the use of the term “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment should be read literally to include
all people within the territory of the United States).
333. But cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202−03 (offering somewhat more protection to
undocumented children).
334. Indeed, this insight probably explains why the federal administration has favored
preemption challenges over equal protection challenges in its legal assault on subfederal
restrictionist laws.
335. See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 329, at 1−2, 5 (claiming that federal law embodies antidiscrimination norms); Margulies, supra note 19; Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6,
at 1731−38 (arguing that institutional preemption-based arguments have been more effective in
court than individual equal protection arguments).
336. E.g., Guttentag, supra note 329, at 6; Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6.
337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182).
338. Id.
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only minutes later in the Solicitor General’s comments, Justice Scalia
was quick to remind the Solicitor General of his earlier commitment
339
to what the case was not about.
These Justices’ rush to a doctrinal tourniquet seems rather selfevident. If a doctrinal accommodation is warranted in the
immigration context to account for rampant (though hidden)
discriminatory intent, such accommodation should most naturally
come in an equal protection challenge, not as a distorting variable in
preemption analysis. Exactly how many thumbs on the scale in favor
of preemption should the threat of subfederal discrimination yield?
How would the threat of discrimination be proved; or, would the
340
burden be on the subfederal government to disprove it? More
generally, why would or should a court modify preemption doctrine
instead of equal protection doctrine to accommodate concerns about
discrimination? If the preemption doctrine is utilized to require
anything less than the equal protection doctrine currently does,
preemption may operate simply as an end-run around those hurdles.
But if the shortfall is with the equal protection doctrine—either in
general or as applied to immigration in particular—why not simply
change that?
These are tough and important questions. Yet they take me too far
afield from my more immediate point: Immigrant advocates might do
well to prefer equal protection’s scalpel over exclusivity’s
sledgehammer. Excluding a subfederal role in enforcement will not
necessarily rid immigration enforcement of discrimination; it simply
accumulates potential for discrimination in the federal government.
Though for the moment we may prefer to take our chances with
federal enforcement, we need not look far for examples of executive
341
enforcement policies alleged to violate civil liberties. Investing in a

339. Id. at 47.
340. Cf. Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6, at 1743 (“An equal protection
challenge would require proof of discriminatory intent, but a preemption challenge can
persuade some judges based on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent. One wonders if
the [Hazleton district court] would have found preemption if the plaintiffs had not introduced so
much evidence on race and ethnicity.”).
341. See e.g., Mohita Anand & Constantin Schreiber, The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of
Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy (Pa. State Law Rights Working Grp. 2012), available at
http://law.psu.edu/_file/clinics/NSEERS_report.pdf. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE
HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (reviewing harsh measures through immigration and other
laws directed at Arab and Muslim noncitizens in the name of the “War on Terror”); Kevin R.
Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v.
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federal monopoly over immigration enforcement dangerously leaves
no meaningful checks on federal action, because under the plenary
doctrine such checks may not readily come from the courts, and
subfederal units will have no traction for dissenting action. An
approach that insists on federal exclusivity in the name of civil
liberties may thus have it backward. Again, recent subfederal
resistance to the Executive’s Secure Communities program provides
one example of the potential value in dissenting subfederal action
against what many immigrant advocates perceive as executive
342
overreaching.
This leads to a fourth, and final, point. In light of the subfederal
restrictionist measures actually on the table, the unknown variable of
an as-yet-to-be-determined congressional response may still present
the more attractive option. But, for decades, the congressional trend
343
has been to significantly tighten immigration control. Though there
may be hope for directional change, prudence suggests investing such
hope in the political process rather than in judicial doctrines that
would leave those choices unchecked by both the courts and the
subfederal governments. Such a state of affairs would surrender what
little remains of the “double security” baked into our government
344
structure.
To summarize, then, arguments for exceptionalism in immigration
federalism may ultimately prove counterproductive to immigrants. At
least a greater degree of reflection seems warranted given: (1) the
expressed desire of some subfederal governments to afford more
rights and protection than federal law requires or allows; (2) the
absence of any clear direction on how the federal political balance

Brigoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98
GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Ice Settles Case on Controversial Home Raids, CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/icesettles-case-controversial-home-raids (reporting on class action settlement against ICE for
controversial house raids).
342. See supra notes 308−09 and accompanying text (describing subfederal resistance to the
Secure Communities program).
343. See, e.g., The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639;
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 19 Stat. 231; Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also Legomsky, The Making
of United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 677−80 (discussing the pre-1996 congressional
trend).
344. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
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over immigration will be struck; and (3) a Court that cannot be
expected to provide any meaningful check on whatever those federal
political choices end up being.
CONCLUSION
The political and judicial accommodations made for modern
government have brought us a considerable distance from our
original structure. That is mostly water under the bridge, and nothing I
have said here is intended to return us to 1789. Still, however,
immigration structuralism has founding principles in mind, not only
because the Constitution requires it, but also because of the enduring
values they serve.
A generational project among immigration scholars has been to
normalize constitutional immigration law. That is all that immigration
structuralism sets out to do—nothing more, nothing less. More
specifically, it counsels for shedding the immigration preemption
doctrine of special methodological and substantive rules. These
special rules are directed at leaving subfederal governments very little
to do, but for that very reason, also come at the cost of removing a
vital check on federal political choices.
I am not blind to the challenges that immigration structuralism
must overcome. For many skeptics, any abstract appeal of leaving a
role for subfederal governments disassembles in the crucible of
reality. But it is here, I caution, that the political question of what to
do about immigration should not be made to distort the constitutional
question of which institution has the power to do it. Waving the
immigration-exceptionalism flag may help to win a battle or two in
345
the subfederal revolution. Yet it may cost the war.

345. For a similar expression, see Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 173 (“The
context demands innovative legal and political strategies in defense of the alien, one of which
may be to concede lost battles with an eye to winning the war.”).

